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THE SECOND AMENDMENT UNDER A
GOVERNMENT LANDLORD: IS THERE A
RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR LEGAL
FIREARMS IN PUBLIC HOUSING?
JAMIE L. WERSHBALE†
INTRODUCTION
There is substantial controversy over the status and scope of
the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution,
otherwise known as the “right to bear arms.”1 While it is clear
there is no absolute right to gun ownership, what rights
Americans do have, to possess firearms in their homes or
elsewhere, is not entirely settled. This constitutional quagmire is
a source of heated debate between gun control advocates and gun
rights supporters.
The 2008 United States Supreme Court decision in District
of Columbia v. Heller2 shed light on the status of gun ownership
in America, articulating a federal individual right to bear arms
unconnected to militia participation.3 Further illuminating the
rights of gun owners in the United States, the subsequent 2010
decision in McDonald v. Chicago4 answered the open question of
whether the Second Amendment is incorporated to the states:
The Court held “that the Second Amendment right is fully

†
Attorney-Advisor, Office of General Counsel, U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development; J.D., 2009, Florida Coastal School of Law; B.S., 2005, Indiana
University. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this Article are entirely those of the
author and do not necessarily represent the views of the agency or the United
States.
1
U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.”).
2
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
3
Id. at 2797.
4
McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
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applicable to the States.”5 However, despite the outcome in
McDonald, firearm regulation will remain an issue of controversy
and the focus of much litigation.
The question of gun ownership becomes further clouded in
the context of conventional public housing. Public housing
consists of government-owned housing facilities, which shelter
low- and very low-income tenants at significantly reduced rents.6
Taxpayers support public housing at a cost of $11 billion
annually.7 Funds appropriated to the United States Department
of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), a Cabinet-level
federal agency, are formulaically allocated to local public housing
authorities (“PHAs”) to establish, maintain, and operate public
housing developments.8 In public housing, the government is the
landlord.
There are strong bases both for and against permitting legal
firearm possession in public housing. Statistical and anecdotal
evidence of high incidences of gun-related violent crime in
housing projects supports prohibition of all firearms in public
housing.
Constituents’ stereotyping all public housing as
dangerous and dilapidated also favors public housing firearm
bans.9 For many Americans, the term “project” conjures up
thoughts of places like Chicago’s violent drug-ridden CabriniGreen and the now-demolished Robert Taylor Homes—stories of
tenants sleeping in bathtubs for fear of stray bullets, images of
tightly-packed high-rise buildings overrun by gangs, and tales of
lawless places where poor minorities are isolated from society.10

5

Id. at 3026.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1437a (2006 & Supp. II).
7
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ECONOMIC AND BUDGET ISSUE BRIEF: AN OVERVIEW
OF FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR HOUSING 6 (2009), available at http://www.cbo.gov/
ftpdocs/105xx/doc10525/11-03-HousingPrograms.pdf.
8
See id.
9
See Harold R. Holzman et al., Revisiting the Relationship Between Crime and
Architectural Design: An Analysis of Data from HUD’s 1994 Survey of Public
Housing Residents, CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y DEV. & RESEARCH, Feb. 1996, at 107, 121
(“[P]ublic housing highrises may not be as criminogenic as the conventional wisdom
would lead one to believe.”); Susan Mayer & Christopher Jencks, Editorial, War on
Poverty: No Apologies, Please, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1995, at A29.
10
See Mayer & Jencks, supra note 9; cf. Madeline Howard, Subsidized Housing
Policy: Defining the Family, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 97, 99 (2007)
(“[G]overnmental housing policy should go further towards promoting the
integration of low-income housing into the larger community.”).
6
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While this picture of public housing is not baseless, it is far
from a true cross-section of public housing developments
nationwide.11
Over two million Americans live in public
housing,12 the majority being law-abiding citizens working to
better their positions in life.13
Very few public housing
developments are high-rises, let alone high-rises containing
thousands of units like the aforementioned Chicago facilities.14
There is truth in the common perception that poor minorities,
particularly women with young children, populate public
housing, but public housing also supports a significant number of
low-income elderly and disabled persons, as well as nonminority
families.15 Nonetheless, there are still serious concerns about
gun violence in public housing developments, inducing many
PHAs to ban or restrict all firearm ownership.16 However, after
Heller, there are persuasive constitutional arguments that the
law-abiding citizens in these developments should be permitted
to legally possess firearms for defense of hearth and home,
despite government ownership of the units.
This Article examines the right to bear arms under a
residential government landlord, collecting legal scholarship and
decisional law as a guide for future litigation efforts and public
housing policy in the aftermath of Heller and McDonald. Part I
overviews public housing in the United States. Part II concisely
presents the Second Amendment, focusing on the holding in
Heller and discusses incorporation under McDonald. Part III
11
See 42 U.S.C. § 11901 (2006) (stating congressional findings regarding drugs
and drug-related crime in public housing); JESSE MCKINNON, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
THE BLACK POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: MARCH 2002, at 6 (2003), available
at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p20-541.pdf; Holzman et al., supra note 9;
Norm Parish, Public Housing Study: Negative Stereotypes Fail To Hold Up, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 14, 2002, at B5.
12
CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS: INTRODUCTION TO
PUBLIC HOUSING 1 (2008) [hereinafter PUBLIC HOUSING POLICY], available at
http://www.cbpp.org/files/policybasics-housing.pdf.
13
See, e.g., Regina Austin, “Step on a Crack, Break Your Mother’s Back”: Poor
Moms, Myths of Authority, and Drug-Related Evictions from Public Housing, 14
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 273, 288 (2002) (“There are enormous numbers of poor
minority people trapped in desperate economic circumstances who do not resort to
criminal behavior and violence.”).
14
PUBLIC HOUSING POLICY, supra note 12.
15
MCKINNON, supra note 11, at 7; Howard, supra note 10, at 97 (“Families
headed by single women of color now predominate in subsidized housing.”); Michael
A. Stegman, The Fall and Rise of Public Housing, REGULATION, Summer 2002, at
64, 68.
16
See infra Part I.B.
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discusses the state of the law leading up through Heller, as well
as HUD policies and congressional inclinations regarding
firearms in public housing. Part IV explores the post-Heller
constitutionality of firearms in public housing.
This Part
considers potential outcomes after McDonald, including the
validity of a federal laws, the application of state laws, and
challenges based on incorporation, as well as contemplating
issues relevant to the right of armed self-defense. Although
inconclusive as to the constitutionality of banning legal firearms
in public housing, this Article lays the framework for analyzing
the constitutionality of such prohibitions.
The focus is solely federally-subsidized, state-owned public
housing developments—often referenced as “conventional” or
“traditional” public housing—where the government serves as
landlord.
While arguably germane, public university
dormitories, military lodgings, prisons, and Indian housing are
beyond the scope of this Article.17
I.

PUBLIC HOUSING IN THE UNITED STATES

Public housing does not account for a substantial portion of
housing in the United States. Nationwide, there is an inventory
of only 1.16 million units located in fourteen thousand
developments.18 Nonetheless, public housing is a key component
of federal affordable housing policy. Federally authorized and
state created, public housing is implemented and run by local
governmental entities known as PHAs. There are more than
three thousand PHAs in the United States, sheltering more than
one million households in public housing.19 The following Section
overviews public housing and describes the gun-related violence
that has been the impetus for public housing firearm bans.

17
School dormitories, military lodgings, and prisons are forms of government
housing incidental to an overriding pedagogical, militaristic, or penological interest,
respectively. HUD-administered Indian programs provide low-income housing funds
directly to tribal sovereigns but principally recognize the right of tribal selfgovernance. See 25 U.S.C. § 4101(7) (2006 & Supp. II).
18
PUBLIC HOUSING POLICY, supra note 12, at 1, 6.
19
See id. at 2, 5 (approximating 3100 PHAs and 1.04 million households); U.S.
Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., HUD’s Public Housing Program,
http://www.hud.gov/renting/phprog.cfm (last visited Nov. 21, 2010) (approximating
3300 PHAs and 1.2 million households).
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An Overview of Public Housing

The Housing Act of 193720 created public housing as part of
“the first large-scale low-income housing program established by
the federal government.”21 The program was a direct result of
the Great Depression and President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s
New Deal legislation.22 At the federal level, public housing
programs are presently under HUD authority.23
HUD administers a diverse range of housing initiatives
nationwide, public housing being only one of many different
affordable housing and urban development programs.24
A
combination of HUD programs provide federal funding to
regional and local PHAs, making possible the opportunity for
low- and very low-income families25 to live in affordable and
decent housing.26 PHAs are the entities ultimately responsible
for operating public housing developments, in addition to
administering rental assistance programs for private housing.
One such program is called Housing Choice Vouchers (“HCV”),
formerly known as Section 8, which provides portable rental
assistance for families to choose their own housing.27 The
principal difference between public housing and rental assistance
programs is that “public housing is housing for low-income
persons that is actually government-owned,” whereas HCV and

20
United States Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
21
BARRY G. JACOBS, HDR HANDBOOK OF HOUSING AND DEVELOPMENT LAW
§ 2:1 (2010).
22
Id. § 1:3.
23
See U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., supra note 19.
24
See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., PROGRAMS OF HUD: MAJOR
MORTGAGE, GRANT, ASSISTANCE, AND REGULATORY PROGRAMS (2006), available at
www.huduser.org/resources/hudprgs/ProgOfHUD06.pdf.
25
“The term ‘low-income families’ means those families whose incomes do not
exceed 80 per centum of the median income for the area . . . . The term ‘very lowincome families’ means low-income families whose incomes do not exceed 50 per
centum of the median family income for the area . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(b)(2) (2006
& Supp. II). “Families” includes both single persons and families with children.
Id. § 1437a(b)(3).
26
See 42 U.S.C. § 1437(a)(4) (2006).
27
See id. §§ 1437f, 3535(d); 24 C.F.R. § 982.1 (2010); U.S. Dep’t of Hous. &
Urban Dev., Housing Choice Vouchers Fact Sheet, http://www.hud.gov/offices
/pih/programs/hcv/about/fact_sheet.cfm (last visited Nov. 21, 2010) (“The housing
choice voucher program is the federal government’s major program for assisting very
low-income families, the elderly, and the disabled to afford decent, safe, and sanitary
housing in the private market.”).
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project-based rental assistance merely subsidizes privatelyowned housing.28 Simply, only tenants in public housing live
under a governmental landlord.
1.

Public Housing Financing, Ownership, and Management

As an arm of the federal government, HUD oversees public
housing programs. However, HUD does not directly own or
control the facilities because “the Federal Government cannot
through its direct action alone provide for the housing of every
American citizen, or even a majority of its citizens.”29 Rather, the
federal government seeks “to remedy unsafe housing conditions
and the acute shortage of decent and safe dwellings for lowincome families . . . [and] to address the shortage of housing
affordable to low-income families” by assisting states and
political subdivisions of states financially and administratively.30
HUD utilizes local PHAs to establish and operate publicly owned
housing; formula-based grants directly finance capital and
operating expenses.31
PHAs are created under state law specifically to provide
affordable housing for the financially disadvantaged and are
defined as “any State, county, municipality, or other
governmental entity or public body (or agency or instrumentality
thereof) which is authorized to engage in or assist in the
development or operation of public housing.”32 HUD provides
PHAs with technical and professional assistance in various
aspects of planning, development, and management; primary
control of public housing rests with the individual county and
municipal PHAs where housing facilities are located.33 The
federal goal is to vest PHAs with “the maximum amount of

28

JACOBS, supra note 21, § 2:3.
42 U.S.C. § 1437(a)(2).
30
Id. § 1437(a)(1)(A)–(B).
31
See id. § 1437g; 24 C.F.R. § 990.100. Formula-based grants are essentially
allocations of funds based on a mathematical formula that considers a number of
factors and expenses.
32
42 U.S.C. § 1437a(b)(6)(A); see, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-1404 (2010)
(authorizing every city, town, and county to create a housing authority); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 421.04, .08 (West 2010) (creating a housing authority in every city).
33
See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., PUBLIC HOUSING OCCUPANCY
GUIDEBOOK app. III (2003), available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs
/ph/rhiip/phgb_app3.pdf (documenting individual PHAs’ management policies); U.S.
Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., supra note 19.
29
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responsibility and flexibility in program administration, with
appropriate accountability to public housing residents, localities,
and the general public.”34
PHAs are responsible for day-to-day operation and
management of public housing developments. Functions include
assuring lease compliance, periodically reexamining tenant
income eligibility, and terminating leases or evicting tenants.35
PHAs are obligated to provide public housing that is in “decent,
safe and sanitary condition.”36 This standard applies solely to
the physical condition of the property, including the building
exterior, dwelling units, and health conditions, but it does not
contemplate aesthetics or on-site violence.37 Federal law does
require, however, PHAs to design a crime prevention plan in
conjunction with local law enforcement.38
There is an eligible income range for public housing, limiting
occupancy to low- and very low-income families.39 Federal
mandate requires that PHAs provide housing to those persons
most in need, using a target percentage, while implementing
“polic[ies] designed to provide for deconcentration of poverty and
income-mixing.”40 Essentially, tenant selection policies “must
balance certain goals, taking into account individual needs for
low-income housing while preserving the overall purpose of
creating socially and financially sound projects that provide a
decent home and a suitable living environment for the tenants
and promote economic and social diversity.”41
These policies must be spelled out in PHA plans that are
submitted to HUD for review and approval.42 The plans follow
certain requirements and guidelines laid out in statutes and
regulations, but PHAs are entrusted with the discretion to craft
policies appropriate to each entity’s objectives, goals,

34

42 U.S.C. § 1437(a)(1)(C).
See U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., supra note 19.
36
24 C.F.R. § 966.4(e)(1).
37
See id. § 902.23; JACOBS, supra note 21, § 2:118.
38
See 42 U.S.C. § 1437c-1(d)(14) (2006 & Supp. II).
39
See id. § 1437a(a)(1); 24 C.F.R. § 960.201 (providing that at the time of initial
occupancy only low-income families may be admitted to public housing). But see
42 U.S.C. § 1437a(a)(5); 24 C.F.R. § 960.503 (providing limited basis for admission of
over-income families).
40
42 U.S.C. § 1437n(a)(3)(B)(i) (2006); 24 C.F.R. § 903.2.
41
JACOBS, supra note 21, § 2:31.
42
See 42 U.S.C. § 1437c-1.
35
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demographics, and unique concerns.43 HUD has no hand in
discretionary policy choices or day-to-day operations and may
only disapprove a plan if it fails to comply with statutory
requirements.44
Although there is a close link with the federal government,
PHAs act under color of state law.45 Therefore, as “state-created,
federally-funded, locally-administered” entities, PHAs are
“constrained to conduct their operations within the limits of the
due process clause of the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment.”46
Essentially, although PHAs stand as residential landlords, they
are first and foremost the government.47
2.

Public Housing Structures and Residents

Public housing developments have unique structural and
demographic elements.
Physically, public housing facilities
range from detached single-family units to large multifamily
developments.48 Only one-third of public housing tenants live in
buildings with fifty or more units.49 Most structures were built
between 1950 and 1989, with the median falling nearly half a
century ago; however, most buildings are in good physical
condition.50 The vast majority of these buildings are located in
metropolitan areas, with two-thirds of tenants in city centers.51
Less than one-third of public housing tenants report

43

See id.
See id. § 1437c-1(i)(3).
45
See, e.g., Kunkler v. Fort Lauderdale Hous. Auth., 764 F. Supp. 171, 174 (S.D.
Fla. 1991).
46
Caulder v. Durham Hous. Auth., 433 F.2d 998, 1002–03 (4th Cir. 1970)
(citations omitted) (comparing public housing evictions to termination of welfare
benefits); accord Ark. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 94-093, 1994 Ark. AG LEXIS 352, at *2,
*10–13 (Jul. 6, 1994).
47
Rudder v. United States, 226 F.2d 51, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (stating that “[t]he
government as landlord is still the government,” in reference to public housing in the
federally-governed District of Columbia).
48
OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV.,
CHARACTERISTICS OF HUD-ASSISTED RENTERS AND THEIR UNITS IN 2003, at 19
(2008) [hereinafter HUD RENTERS 2003], available at http://www.huduser.org/portal/
publications/pdf/Hud_asst_renters_report_p1.pdf.
49
Id.
50
PUBLIC HOUSING POLICY, supra note 12, at 5; HUD RENTERS 2003, supra note
48.
51
See HUD RENTERS 2003, supra note 48, at 20.
44
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“bothersome” neighborhood crime, and in comparing their prior
accommodations to those in public housing, most tenants report
that public housing provides a better home in a better
neighborhood.52
As for the residents who occupy these structures, there are
certain types of individuals prohibited by federal law. Before
admitting a tenant to occupancy, PHAs must screen out persons
with a pattern of alcohol abuse,53 those engaged in illegal drug
use,54 persons involved in drug-related criminal activity,55 anyone
convicted for manufacturing methamphetamine on federallyassisted housing premises,56 and registered sex offenders.57
Family members fitting within these categories must be excluded
from the application or a prospective household will be denied
admission.58
Of the over one million occupied units, racial composition is
fairly evenly distributed. Approximately 52% percent of public
housing residents are black, approximately 44% of residents are
white; persons of Hispanic ethnicity comprise one-fifth of all
residents.59 There are residents of all ages, with approximately
42% of residents aged thirty-five to sixty-four years, and the
remaining tenants evenly divided into groups aged under thirtyfive years and over sixty-five years.60 Approximately 64% of
households have at least one family member who is elderly or
disabled.61 Female-headed families comprise 70% of the public
housing population, but the majority of households have no
single children under the age of eighteen.62 Most tenants have
some secondary education, although only 30% have earned a high

52

Id. at 25, 27.
24 C.F.R. § 960.204(b) (2010).
54
Id. § 960.204(a)(2).
55
Id. § 960.204(a)(1).
56
Id. § 960.204(a)(3).
57
Id. § 960.204(a)(4).
58
Id. § 960.203(c)(3)(i).
59
HUD RENTERS 2003, supra note 48, at 8 (51.7% black; 43.8% white; 20.7%
Hispanic of any race; 4.5% other races).
60
Id. at 9 (29.5% under thirty-five years old; 42.5% aged thirty-five to sixty-four;
28.1% over age sixty-five).
61
PUBLIC HOUSING POLICY, supra note 12, at 2–3.
62
HUD RENTERS 2003, supra note 48, at 12–13.
53
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school diploma or equivalency, and less than one-fifth of
residents have any postsecondary education.63 The median
household income in 2006 was slightly less than $9,000.64
Under the lease, tenants “have the right to exclusive use and
occupancy of the leased unit [as a private dwelling].”65 Leases
automatically renew and cannot be terminated except for certain
violations or good cause.66 These rules safeguard the lease, such
that a property interest in continued tenancy arises under
procedural due process;67 however, there is no vested right in
occupancy, nor an entitlement or fundamental right in public
housing.68 Although not necessarily correlated, there are many
long-term residents in public housing. More than half of all
tenants have been in their unit for at least four years, and
approximately 16% of tenants have been in their unit for thirteen
or more consecutive years.69 Public housing has “bec[o]me longterm or permanent housing for [many] welfare families and
others stuck at the bottom of the ladder.”70
B.

Firearm-Related Violence in Public Housing

Greater than one-third of American homes contain
firearms.71 Gun statistics establish that in 2006, there were at

63
Id. (16.1% less than ninth grade; 36.6% ninth to twelth grade; 29.6% high
school diploma or equivalency; 17.7% postsecondary education).
64
PUBLIC HOUSING POLICY, supra note 12, at 2.
65
24 C.F.R. § 966.4(d)(1), (f) (2010).
66
42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(1), (5) (2006).
67
Escalera v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 425 F.2d 853, 861 (2d Cir. 1970) (“The
government cannot deprive a private citizen of his continued tenancy, without
affording him adequate procedural safeguards even if public housing could be
deemed to be a privilege.” (citations omitted)). But see Perry v. Hous. Auth., 486 F.
Supp. 498, 503 (D.S.C. 1980) (holding tenants cannot claim substantive due process
violations because there is no constitutional right to adequate housing, even in
public housing developments), aff’d, 664 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1981).
68
See Hassan v. Wright, 45 F.3d 1063, 1069 (7th Cir. 1995) (“There is no
affirmative right to governmental aid, even where the absence of such aid means the
loss of life, liberty or property interests that the government may not affirmatively
deny.” (citations omitted)).
69
HUD RENTERS 2003, supra note 48, at 10 (45% in the unit zero to three years;
27.6% in the unit four to eight years; 11.6% in the unit nine to thirteen years; 15.8%
in the unit longer than thirteen years).
70
JACOBS, supra note 21, § 2:2.
71
Brady Campaign To Prevent Gun Violence, Unintentional Shootings,
http://www.bradycampaign.org/facts/gunviolence/gvunintentional (last visited Nov.
21, 2010) (“Thirty-three percent of U.S. households contain a gun.” (citing PEW
RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS, 2009 VALUES SURVEY: FINAL
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least 642 unintentional firearm deaths in the United States,
12,791 firearm homicides, and 16,883 firearm suicides.72 In 2008,
two-thirds of all homicides were committed with firearms, and
one-half of all murders were committed with handguns.73 In
nonhomicide offenses, firearms were used in 43.5% of all
robberies74 and 21.4% of all aggravated assaults.75 These are
national statistics.
Statistics on similar incidences occurring in public housing
are generally unavailable. “[C]rime in public housing has yet to
be routinely and systematically measured.”76 However, violence
and victimization surveys reflect “higher [rates] in public housing
compared to other contexts . . . attributed in part to drug use and
sale.”77 Drugs impact crime in public housing by attracting nonresidents to the facilities.78

TOPLINE
9
(2009),
http://people-press.org/reports/questionnaires/513.pdf));
Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online 1, tbl.2.60.2008 (2008),
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t2602008.pdf (reporting forty-two percent of
Americans have a gun in their home).
72
BRADY CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, UNITED STATES FIREARM DEATHS
BY AGE GROUP AND INTENT: 2006 (2009), available at http://www.bradycenter.org/
xshare/pdf/facts/firearm-deaths-age-intent.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2010).
73
See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United
States: 2005, Expanded Homicide Data tbl.10, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/
05cius/offenses/expanded_information/data/shrtable_10.html (last visited Nov. 21,
2010).
74
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United
States: 2008, Robbery tbl.3, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2008/offenses/expanded_
information/data/robberytable_03.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2010).
75
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United
States: 2008, Aggravated Assault tbl., http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2008/offenses/
expanded_information/data/agassaulttable.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2010).
76
ROBERT A. HYATT & HAROLD R. HOLZMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN
DEV., GUIDEBOOK FOR MEASURING CRIME IN PUBLIC HOUSING WITH GEOGRAPHIC
INFORMATION SYSTEMS 5 (1999), available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/
doc/crimegis.doc.
77
Jeffrey Fagan et al., The Paradox of the Drug Elimination Program in New
York City Public Housing, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 415, 416 (2006).
78
See, e.g., Press Release, Vice President Al Gore, Press Briefing by the Vice
President, Secretary Henry Cisneros, Secretary Lloyd Bentsen, Attorney General
Janet Reno, and Director of Drug Policy Lee Brown (Feb. 4, 1994), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=59790
(“[The]
Connecticut
Housing Authority reports . . . 85 percent of those arrested on public housing
authority property do not live there.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

84 St. John’s L. Rev. 995 (2010)

1006

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:995

In 2000, HUD issued the first comprehensive report on
firearm-related violence in PHA-owned developments.79 The
study made significant findings and determinations, many of
which favor banning gun possession in public housing
developments on public policy grounds.80 As a general premise,
the study states, “[t]here is a strong correlation between income
and violent crime; thus the low-income population in public
housing is especially vulnerable to gun violence.”81 The report
estimates that persons living in government-subsidized housing
are more than two times as likely to be victimized by gun
violence than the rest of the population.82
HUD compiled statistics indicate that gunshots are a major
crime problem and that twenty-two percent of public housing
tenants feel unsafe in their project or neighborhood.83 The study
estimates that there are 200 unintentional firearm injuries
annually in public housing.84 Further, on average, there was one
gun-related homicide per day “in 66 of the Nation’s 100 largest
public housing authorities” in 1998.85 “[I]n a larger group of more
than 550 housing authorities, there were an estimated 296 gunrelated homicides in public housing authorities across the
country in the first 6 months of 1999 alone.”86
The study found no distinction between firearm violence in
small metropolitan areas versus larger cities. “[R]esidents of
public housing in metro areas of less than 500,000 residents have
the same or higher rates of gun violence victimization as public
housing residents in larger metro areas.”87 Further, a survey of
public housing residents indicated there was “no [discernible]

79
U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., IN THE CROSSFIRE: THE IMPACT OF GUN
VIOLENCE ON PUBLIC HOUSING COMMUNITIES 29 (2000) [hereinafter IN THE
CROSSFIRE], available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181158.pdf.
80
See id. at 2–3. But see Council of Large Pub. Hous. Auths., CLPHA Takes Aim
at HUD Report on Gun Violence in Public Housing, http://web.archive.org
/web/20060929004037/http://www.clpha.org/page.cfm?pageID=361 (last visited Nov.
21, 2010) (“Th[e] report [IN THE CROSSFIRE] is not a useful contribution because it
relies on inadequate data and careless data analysis.”).
81
IN THE CROSSFIRE, supra note 79, at 14.
82
Id. The rate of gun victimization reflected here is likely less than the actual
rate because the statistics used did not include homicides. Id. at 40.
83
Id. at 28.
84
Id. at 20.
85
Id. at 14.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 18.

84 St. John’s L. Rev. 995 (2010)

2010]

FIREARMS IN PUBLIC HOUSING

1007

direct relationship between the proportion of residents troubled
by various types of crime and the size of the development.”88
In response to the HUD report, a university criminologist
stated, “the findings are not surprising: ‘Housing projects tend to
be hot spots.’ The primary reason is economics . . . . ‘There are
still pockets of poverty in this nation, and where you find that
and people without a stake in the community, you’ll find some
violence.’ ”89 Unfortunately, the “high incidence of gun-related
violence imposes a devastating number of deaths, as well as
injuries and physical and psychic trauma,” on those living in
public housing developments.90 In an effort to solve these
problems, a number of PHAs have moved to prohibit and severely
restrict firearm possession on-site.
II. THE SECOND AMENDMENT: A RIGHT TO KEEP AND
BEAR ARMS
The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution
reads, in its entirety: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary
to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and
bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”91 These twenty-seven words
are the subject of much discussion in newspapers, periodicals,
meeting halls, and courtrooms across the country, but the
meaning and application still remains largely up for debate.
The United States Supreme Court rarely encounters the
Second Amendment and revisited it for the first time in nearly
seventy years when it struck down District of Columbia gun
control laws in Heller in 2008. The Court held that “the District’s
ban on handgun possession in the home violates the Second
Amendment, as does its prohibition against rendering any lawful
firearm in the home operable for the purpose of immediate selfdefense.”92 Essentially, the Court held that there is an individual
right to bear arms for self-defense unassociated with
participation in a militia, a right that was recently incorporated
to the states under McDonald in 2010. While the Heller decision
88

Holzman et al., supra note 9, at 112.
Gary Fields, Gun Risk Double in Public Housing: HUD’s Estimates on Crime
Not Surprising, Analyst Says, USA TODAY, Feb. 17, 2000, at 3A (quoting Mike
Rustigan, San Francisco State University criminologist).
90
IN THE CROSSFIRE, supra note 79, at 5.
91
U.S. CONST. amend. II (emphasis added).
92
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821–22 (2008) (emphasis
omitted).
89
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leaves many questions unanswered, the Court stated, “whatever
else i[s] le[ft] to future evaluation, [the Second Amendment]
surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding,
responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”93
A.

District of Columbia v. Heller: An Individual Right To Bear
Arms

The right to bear arms, as it is articulated in Heller directly
and undeniably impacts the constitutionality of PHAimplemented firearm bans in public housing. The following
Section concisely outlines the majority and dissenting opinions in
this five to four United States Supreme Court decision.
1.

Heller Majority Opinion

Framing the issue, the Heller Court considered “whether a
District of Columbia prohibition on the possession of usable
handguns in the home violates the Second Amendment to the
Constitution.”94 The challenged statutes required residents to
keep lawfully owned firearms unloaded, disassembled, or bound
by a trigger lock when in the resident’s home; lawful ownership
extended only to long guns but not handguns, due to strict
registration requirements.95 The Heller majority unequivocally
determined the statutes to be invalid as a functional ban on all
handguns and firearms.96 The Court ultimately held that
Congress could not infringe upon an individual’s right to legally
bear firearms, unconnected to militia participation, in one’s home
for self-defense purposes.97
The Court came to this determination after a lengthy review
of the language and history of the Second Amendment.98 First
considering the meaning of the text, the Court grammatically
seperated the two parts of the clause. The Court determined the
operative clause—“the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms”99—“guarantee[s] the individual right to possess and carry

93
94
95
96
97
98
99

Id. at 2821.
Id. at 2787–88 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 2788.
Id. at 2818.
Id. at 2821–22.
See id. 2788–822.
U.S. CONST. amend. II.

84 St. John’s L. Rev. 995 (2010)

2010]

FIREARMS IN PUBLIC HOUSING

1009

weapons in case of confrontation.”100 And the prefatory clause—
that is, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security
of a free State”101—“announces the purpose for which the right [to
keep and bear arms] was codified: to prevent elimination of the
militia.”102 When putting the textual elements together, the
Court found “that they guarantee the individual right to possess
and carry weapons in case of confrontation”103 but not “for any
sort of confrontation.”104 Essentially, the Second Amendment
protects an individual, but not unlimited, right to bear arms.
Concluding an individual right exists, the Court then turned
to handguns as a class of firearms.105 The Court found handguns
to be “the quintessential self-defense weapon,” implicitly
declaring handguns instrumental to the Second Amendment
right because self-defense is a central tenet of Second
Amendment jurisprudence.106 The Court also determined that
the need for self-defense is “most acute” in the protection of one’s
self, family, and home.107 Therefore, a ban on handguns in the
home would, “[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny[,] . . . fail
constitutional muster.”108
The Court did not proceed further, declining to aver which
level of scrutiny is applicable to Second Amendment challenges
or to specify which other gun restrictions may be
unconstitutional.109 However, as general language of restriction,
the Court noted, in dicta, that the right articulated should not
“be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as
schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions
and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”110

100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110

Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2789, 2797.
U.S. CONST. amend. II.
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2799, 2801.
Id. at 2797.
Id. at 2799.
Id. at 2817.
See id. at 2817–18.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2821.
Id. at 2816–17.
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Heller Dissenting Opinions

Each of the two dissents in Heller focuses on a distinct issue.
While it appears that the entire Court concurred as to some form
of an individual right under the Second Amendment,111 Justice
Stevens considered the right applicable only in relation to a
militia purpose.112 Justice Breyer concluded the gun control law
at issue was a reasonable burden on gun owners and a
proportionate response to urban gun-related violence.113
In contrast to the Heller majority, Justice Stevens’s dissent
opined that “to keep” and “to bear” are not separate rights but
one right “to have arms available and ready for military service,
and to use them for military purposes when necessary.”114 The
key to Justice Stevens’s dissent is that the Second Amendment is
limited to a strictly military application, not a private right of
confrontation or self-defense.115
Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion noted agreement with
Justice Stevens’s conclusion, stating that while militia and selfdefense interests are intertwined, “self-defense alone, detached
from any militia-related objective, is not the [Second]
Amendment’s concern.”116 However, the key to Justice Breyer’s
dissent is an “interest-balancing” approach, weighing urban gun
problems against the limited Second Amendment right to possess
firearms.117 The opinion concludes, that based on precedential
First Amendment “intermediate scrutiny” jurisprudence, courts
should defer to the judgment of the legislature.118

111

Id. at 2797; id. at 2848 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2822–23 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
113
See id. at 2847–48 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
114
Id. at 2830 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115
See id. at 2846.
116
Id. at 2847 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
117
Id. at 2852.
118
Id. at 2860 (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997))
(“[T]his Court, in First Amendment cases applying intermediate scrutiny, has said
that [the Court’s] ‘sole obligation’ in reviewing a legislature’s ‘predictive judgments’
is ‘to assure that, in formulating its judgments,’ the legislature ‘has drawn
reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence.’ ”).
112
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McDonald v. Chicago: Second Amendment Incorporation to
the States

Heller did not decide if the Second Amendment is
incorporated to the states.119 It was not necessary to consider
incorporation because the District of Columbia is entirely under
federal jurisdiction.120 Incorporation is a legal theory that makes
applicable to the states the provisions of the Bill of Rights
through the Fourteenth Amendment.121 There are two theories of
incorporation: “total” and “selective.”122 These theories, as the
names imply, either incorporate the Bill of Rights in toto or ad
hoc, respectively.123 The Slaughter-House Cases,124 decided in
1873, rejected total incorporation under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause and still stands as good law.125 Modern
jurisprudence is premised on the selective incorporation
approach; prior to the McDonald decision, all but “the Second,
the Third, the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth, and the Seventh
Amendments” had been incorporated to, and had become binding
on, the states.126 Before McDonald, the last time the Court
considered the Second Amendment’s application to the states was
prior to modern incorporation jurisprudence.127
On June 28, 2010, the United States Supreme Court issued a
concise ruling in McDonald, settling the question of Second

119

Id. at 2813 n.23 (majority opinion).
See id.; see also Josh Blackman & Ilya Shapiro, Keeping Pandora’s Box
Sealed: Privileges or Immunities, The Constitution in 2020, and Properly Extending
the Right to Keep and Bear Arms to the States, 8 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 10 (2010).
121
16A GEORGE BLUM ET AL., AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 421 (2d ed. 2010).
122
Id.
123
See id.
124
83 U.S. 36 (1872).
125
See id. at 77–79.
126
DAVID H. GANS & DOUGLAS T. KENDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY
CTR., THE GEM OF THE CONSTITUTION: THE TEXT AND HISTORY OF THE PRIVILEGES
OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 20 (2008), available at
http://www.theusconstitution.org/upload/filelists/241_Gem_of_the_Constitution.pdf.
127
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2813 n.23 (2008) (“With
respect to [United States v.] Cruikshank’s [, 92 U.S. 542 (1875),] continuing validity
on incorporation, a question not presented by this case, we note that Cruikshank
also said that the First Amendment did not apply against the States and did not
engage in the sort of Fourteenth Amendment inquiry required by our later cases.
Our later decisions in Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886) and Miller v.
Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 538 (1894), reaffirmed that the Second Amendment applies only
to the Federal Government.” (emphasis omitted)).
120

84 St. John’s L. Rev. 995 (2010)

1012

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:995

Amendment incorporation.128 The question presented asked the
Court to consider whether the Second Amendment right
articulated in Heller is incorporated to the states under either
the Due Process Clause or the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.129 In the narrow context of the
Second Amendment, incorporation under either Due Process or
Privileges and Immunities would have a similar net result, but
the Court declined to reconsider the Slaughter-House Cases and
the issue of incorporation under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause.130 Deciding the issue under the selective incorporation
Due Process approach, the Court determined that the right
articulated in Heller applies equally to the states because it is “a
provision of the Bill of Rights that protects a right that is
fundamental from an American perspective.”131 Although the
Court uses the word “fundamental,” it is careful to note that the
assurances in Heller limiting the right to bear arms are
unaffected by incorporation: “incorporation does not imperil
every law regulating firearms.”132 Given the individual rights
reading in Heller, it was highly improbable that Second
Amendment jurisprudence would not be incorporated to the
states in McDonald.133

128

See McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
Id. (“Question Presented: Whether the Second Amendment right to keep and
bear arms is incorporated as against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Privileges or Immunities or Due Process Clauses.”).
130
Id. at 3030–31.
131
Id. at 3050.
132
Id. at 3047.
133
See David A. Lieber, Comment, The Cruikshank Redemption: The Enduring
Rationale for Excluding the Second Amendment from the Court’s Modern
Incorporation Doctrine, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1079, 1083 (2005) (“In most
instances where a constitutional right enjoys textual support, the Court’s
endorsement of the right as uniquely individual is both a necessary and sufficient
condition for its incorporation.”). Additionally, the states largely support
incorporation of the Second Amendment. David B. Kopel, The Right to Arms in the
Living Constitution, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 99, 130–31 (“In McDonald,
with incorporation squarely before the Court, 38 states filed an amicus in favor of
incorporation.”).
129
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III. LEGAL FIREARMS IN PUBLIC HOUSING: POLICY AND LAW
PHAs hold a legitimate and important governmental interest
in the suppression of crime and violence in public housing.134
PHAs represent not only a governmental interest in safety and
general welfare but a proprietary ownership interest. To this
end, PHAs are given wide berth in controlling public housing
developments. Public housing tenants are regulated to a much
higher degree than in a traditional landlord-tenant
relationship—tenants are required to submit financial
information for income certification, seek PHA approval for
certain changes to household composition, and agree to transfer
units upon PHA request.135 In the First Amendment context,
courts have permitted PHAs to interfere with tenants’ rights of
free association given circumstances related to crime and
violence reduction, and “one-strike” evictions provide PHAs with
a high degree of discretion over lease terminations.136 Therefore,
burdening individual rights in public housing is not immediately
suspect given the regulatory state under which tenants live.
However, there are limits. For instance, warrantless contraband
sweeps were enjoined as a violation of tenants’ Fourth
Amendment rights.137
As for public housing residents possessing legal firearms
within their units, there is no clear answer. There is no uniform
legislation, policy, or decisive judicial ruling to settle the
questions that arise. This Part outlines the present state of the
law regarding guns in public housing. Federal housing policy is
first considered, although neither HUD nor Congress has
followed a clear path.
A.

HUD’s Position on Guns in Public Housing

At present, HUD does not have an official position either for
or against tenant possession of legal firearms in public housing
134
Thompson v. Ashe, 250 F.3d 399, 407 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Rucker v. Davis,
237 F.3d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 2001)).
135
24 C.F.R. § 966.4(c) (2010).
136
See generally Chavez v. Hous. Auth. of El Paso, 973 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir. 1992)
(upholding eviction from public housing for failure to control guests in violation of
lease); Herring v. Chi. Hous. Auth., No. 90 C 3797, 1995 WL 77305, at *1, *10 (N.D.
Ill. Feb. 21, 1995) (upholding eviction of tenant who allegedly signed in three
nonresidents who were members of an anti-Chicago Housing Authority protest
group under false names).
137
See Pratt v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 848 F. Supp. 792, 797 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
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developments.138 The sample public housing lease requires a
tenant not to “display, use, or possess or allow members of
Tenant’s household or guests to display, use or possess any
illegal firearms, (operable or inoperable) or other illegal weapons
as defined by the laws and courts of the State of ______ anywhere
on the property of PHA.”139 Unlike housing regulations, the
sample lease is not codified and serves only as a resource for
PHAs to consult.
HUD regulations explicitly address pet
ownership in public housing, but they do not address legal gun
ownership.140
Fifteen years ago, HUD took a stronger stance on the issue of
guns in public housing. In 1994, during the tenure of HUD
Secretary Cisneros, the Clinton administration considered
banning firearms from all federally-funded public housing—
equivocating between prohibiting only handguns and an outright
ban on all firearms—in an effort to reduce violent crime.141
Secretary Cisneros said of the proposition, “there is no doubt that
I feel that is the proper direction.”142 When announcing the plan,
the Secretary proclaimed, “We have the authority.” Although it
is questionable that the federal Housing Act authorizes HUD to
promulgate such a regulation. The Secretary also mentioned
potential controversy over federal-versus-local enactment of a
firearms ban.143

138
See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., PUBLIC HOUSING OCCUPANCY
GUIDEBOOK 189 (2003), available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph
/rhiip/phguidebooknew.pdf (“Optional provisions included in many PHA leases relate
to a wide range of topics including for example: use or possession of weapons . . . in a
PHA unit.”); see also LEE WILLIAMS, CAESAR RODNEY INST., HUD: PUBLIC HOUSING
GUN BANS A LOCAL DECISION 1–2 (2010), available at http://www.caesarrodney.org
/pdfs/WHAlegalfolloPDF.pdf (“ ‘[HUD] do[es not] have any policy that relates to
[public housing firearms bans],’ said Maria Bynum, spokesperson for HUD’s regional
office in Philadelphia . . . . Bynum explained that while HUD subsidizes public
housing, and conducts limited inspections, they do not get involved, ‘in day-to-day
operations. [HUD is] not involved in that.’ ”).
139
U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., PUBLIC HOUSING OCCUPANCY
GUIDEBOOK app. 4, at 293 (2003) (emphasis added), available at
http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/rhiip/phgb_app4_7new.pdf.
140
See 24 C.F.R. § 960.707 (2010).
141
Scripps Howard, U.S. Considers Ban on All Guns in Public Housing, PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland), Feb. 5, 1994, at 12A.
142
Susan Page, Prez Eyes Gun Ban in Public Housing, NEWSDAY, Feb. 5, 1994,
at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted).
143
Id.
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Opponents of the proposed Clinton-Cisneros gun ban argued
the plan would “skirt the constitutional guarantee of [the] right
to bear arms . . . [because t]enants could still own guns but would
have to sign a lease saying they could not possess the gun in
their homes or on housing authority property.”144 In contrast,
proponents of the ban, such as then-executive director of the
National Association of Housing and Development Officials,
stated the proposed ban simply “represents an attempt by the
‘owner-manager of public housing development to try to ensure
the safety and security of residents.’ ”145 The proposed ban never
came to fruition.
The later-published HUD study on firearm-related violence
in public housing found a general decline in crime rates in public
housing developments.146 Even so, HUD determined firearmrelated violence remained a prevalent problem because gunrelated violence and victimization disproportionately impacts
public housing residents.147 HUD proposed a number of anticrime and gun control initiatives but stopped short of suggesting
banning guns from public housing.148
In 1999, around the time the HUD gun-violence study was
released, the Clinton White House and HUD implemented
“BuyBack America.”149 Under this now-defunct program,150 HUD
allocated $15 million to PHAs to partner with local law
enforcement agencies to purchase guns for $50 per firearm; the
goal of the program was to remove 300,000 guns from the

144

Howard, supra note 141.
Id. (the article incorrectly states the name of the organization as the
“National Association of Housing and Development Agencies”).
146
IN THE CROSSFIRE, supra note 79, at 10.
147
See id. at 8.
148
See id. at 29–30. The recommendations advanced in the study include
increased formula grants for anti-crime strategies, community gun safety initiatives,
and crime prevention through environmental design. Id. at 30.
149
Notice of Funding Availability; Public Housing Drug Elimination Program;
Gun BuyBack Violence Reduction Initiative, 64 Fed. Reg. 60,080 (Nov. 3, 1999);
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., President Clinton Announces
Violence-Prevention Initiative To Buy Up to 300,000 Guns (Sept. 9, 1999),
http://archives.hud.gov/news/1999/pr99-185.html.
150
See NOFA for Public Housing Drug Elimination Program Gun BuyBack
Violence Reduction Initiative; Notice of Amendment and Republication, 65 Fed. Reg.
5400 (Feb. 3, 2000) (“The Department will no longer approve PHA applications for
further gun buyback violence reduction initiatives under this notice after the
available matching funds have been awarded.”).
145
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streets.151 Then-HUD Secretary Cuomo stated, in regard to the
buyback program, “Guns kill and injure people every day in
crimes, in accidents, and in suicides. Buying back guns will save
lives and will help build strong partnerships between police and
people in communities to work together to reduce gun
violence.”152 The Clinton administration and Secretary Cuomo
also threatened litigation against gun manufacturers, offering to
support the nation’s PHAs in a class-action suit designed to urge
the production of safer firearms.153
Gun control initiatives and threatened litigation have not
been prominent in HUD public housing policy since the Clinton
administration. President Bush terminated BuyBack America,154
and the Obama administration has not defined a public housing
firearms policy, focusing instead on equality of civil rights and
improved neighborhoods.155
B.

Congressional Position on Guns in Public Housing

In 1994, the United States House of Representatives
introduced House Bill 4062, entitled “Safe Public Housing Act.”156
The bill did not seek a per se firearms ban in public housing, but
rather left the choice to residents.
The law would have
established a tenant referendum, allowing public housing
residents to elect either to ban firearms from their development
or to require firearm registration; these gun controls would have
been later incorporated into tenant leases.157 The proposal did
not make it out of committee.
Contrarily, in 2009, the United States House of
Representatives sought to permit unfettered legal firearm
possession in public housing under House Bill 3045, entitled

151

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., supra note 149.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
153
David Stout & Richard Perez-Pena, Housing Agencies To Sue Gun Makers,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1999, at A1.
154
See Notice Terminating Funding Availability for Public Housing Drug
Elimination Program Gun Buyback Violence Reduction Initiative, 66 Fed. Reg.
38,301 (July 23, 2001).
155
See, e.g., REMARKS AT A DISCUSSION ON URBAN AND METROPOLITAN POLICY,
2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC 00562, at 3 (July 13, 2009); Change.gov., The ObamaBiden Plan, http://change.gov/agenda/urbanpolicy_agenda (last visited Nov. 21,
2010).
156
Safe Public Housing Act, H.R. 4062, 103d Cong. (1994).
157
Id. § 26(b)(1).
152
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“Section 8 Voucher Reform Act of 2009.”158 An amendment
agreed to in committee included the language: “Neither the
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, nor any public
housing agency, nor any owner of federally assisted housing may
establish any prohibition or restriction on the otherwise lawful
possession or use of firearms in federally assisted housing.”159
This language encountered forceful public opposition from local
governmental entities.160 It appears there is insufficient support
for this bill to pass into law.
This
latter
legislation
demonstrates
congressional
acceptance of the individual rights reading of the Second
Amendment presented in Heller.161 Congressional support for
gun rights is further exemplified by the number of
Congresspersons who joined as amici supporting the Second
Amendment in the Heller and McDonald cases. When Heller was
before the Supreme Court, fifty-five Senators and two hundred
and fifty Representatives urged the Court to strike down the gun
control law as unconstitutional.162 McDonald garnered similar
support, adding two additional Senators and one Representative
158

Section 8 Voucher Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 3045, 111th Cong.
Id. § 578A.
160
See, e.g., Press Release, Mayor Greg Nickels, The Nation’s Mayors Oppose
Thune Amendment, Actions To Weaken Gun Safety Laws (July 20, 2009),
http://usmayors.org/pressreleases/uploads/RELEASENICKELSONTHUNEGUNAM
ENDMENT72009.pdf (“[T]he gun lobby is . . . pushing members of Congress to offer
amendments to legislation that will make it easier for criminals and others who
shouldn’t have access to guns . . . . [The amendment] would bar public housing
authorities from restricting gun ownership among public housing residents, a
practice that has been in place in some areas for a decade or more and has helped to
make these projects safer places in which to live.”); Mike Mentrek, Cuyahoga
Metropolitan Housing Authority Faults U.S. House Plan To Allow Guns in Public
Housing, CLEVELAND.COM (July 10, 2009, 9:17 PM), http://blog.cleveland.com/metro
/2009/07/cuyahoga_metropolitan_housing.html (“ ‘This [proposal] goes opposite to
everything we’ve tried to do in the past 10 or 15 years to regain control of public
housing, to move crime and drugs away,’ said George Phillips, executive director of
[Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority]. ‘It’s short sighted . . . and I can’t speak
strongly enough about how absurd this is,’ he said.” (first alteration in original)).
161
In final form, the text of section 512—Protecting Americans from Violent
Crime—states that “Congress needs to weigh in on the new regulations to ensure
that unelected bureaucrats and judges cannot again override the Second
Amendment rights of law-abiding citizens.” Credit Card Accountability
Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, § 512(a)(7), 123 Stat.
1734, 1765.
162
Brief for 55 Members of United States Senate et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (No.
07-290).
159
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to Heller’s amici numbers.163 Each of these briefs represented the
largest number of Congresspersons to join together in a Supreme
Court amicus brief.164
At this time, there is substantial
congressional support for individual rights under the Second
Amendment, although no further legislation specifically
targeting firearms in public housing has been introduced.
C.

State of the Law

There is scant legal authority as to firearm possession in
public housing. In what little case law and legal scholarship are
available, there is no uniformity across the authorities, and state
statutes plainly vary from one jurisdiction to the next. The
following Section overviews firearm possession on governmentowned property and in public housing as it stands today. The
discussion encompasses relevant decisional law and legal
scholarship both prior and immediately subsequent to Heller.
1.

Government-Owned Buildings

Even though PHAs are state governmental actors entitled to
regulate PHA-owned property,165 there is a general dearth of
caselaw analyzing the status of PHAs as property owners and
managers, particularly with respect to the right to bear arms. As
such, a review of weapons regulations involving other types of
government-owned properties may lend valuable insight into the
issue of guns in public housing. Both state and federal laws are
useful in this regard.
As a general premise, the Heller Court took care to note that
the individual right articulated in no way impugns “laws
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as
schools and government buildings.”166 The Court did not explain
the rationale for permitting such gun laws to remain intact nor
did it provide objective standards to evaluate what constitutes a
“sensitive place.” Nonetheless, implicit in this proclamation is

163
Brief for Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2009) (No. 08-1521).
164
Kopel, supra note 133.
165
See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47–48 (1966) (“The State, no less
than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its
control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.”).
166
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817 (2008) (emphasis added).
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the understanding that Heller does not affect jurisprudence
upholding and rationalizing gun bans in government-owned
buildings and properties.
On federal lands, a recently enacted law repealed prior
regulations that prohibited firearm possession in national parks.
Explaining the rationale for this change in the law, Congress
stated that the now-repealed law had prevented “individuals
complying with Federal and State laws from exercising the
[S]econd [A]mendment rights of the individuals.”167 However,
most other federal properties are still considered to be gun-free
zones. Federal law criminalizes the possession of firearms in all
federal buildings and courthouse facilities.168 For instance, a
post-Heller court upheld a handgun ban on property owned by
the United States Postal Service, reasoning that “restrictions on
guns stemmed from [the Postal Service’s] constitutional
authority as the property owner.” Additionally, usage of the
parking lot where the firearm was found made it “a place of
regular government business, . . . fall[ing] under the ‘sensitive
places’ exception recognized by Heller.”169 This ruling confirms
that a government landowner may regulate its property as it sees
fit and implies a broad application of the “sensitive places”
concept.
Similarly, state and local governments prohibit firearm
possession within governmental facilities and on governmentowned property. A state government, “no less than a private
owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its
control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated . . . . The
United States Constitution does not forbid a State to control the
use of its own property for its own lawful nondiscriminatory
purpose.”170
For instance, a 2004 Tennessee Attorney General opinion
addresses the right of government landlords—not PHAs
specifically—to regulate firearm possession on governmentowned land.171 The Tennessee Constitution has a right to bear
167
Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L.
No. 111-24, § 512(a)(4), 123 Stat. 1734, 1765.
168
18 U.S.C. § 930 (2006 & Supp. II).
169
United States v. Dorosan, 350 F. App’x 874, 875 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 1714 (2010).
170
Adderley, 385 U.S. at 47–48.
171
Tenn. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 04-020, 2004 WL 367637, at *1 (Feb. 9, 2004)
(citations omitted).
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arms provision, but the state supreme court has recognized the
legislative police power to regulate firearms.172 The state has the
authority to prohibit firearm possession on government-owned
property, and “local governments have been granted the power
[under state statute] to determine if they wish to allow weapons
on their property.”173 Any regulation must be “guided by” and
“restrained to” the state constitution and “bear some well defined
relation to the prevention of crime.”174 Essentially, state and
local governments have the right to regulate government-owned
properties so long as the regulations are within constitutional
bounds. By extension, PHAs, as local government actors, may
regulate weapons on PHA-owned properties in an effort to
prevent crime.
2.

Legal Firearms in Public Housing

“In response to escalating violent crime, drugs and chaos
within public housing, several housing authorities have looked to
gun control as an antidote to violence and crime.”175 PHAs
address gun control through “house rules” and lease provisions,
but there is no standardization. Some leases do not address
firearm possession at all, others prohibit only illegal firearm
possession, some require permits or registration, and yet others
ban outright the possession of any firearm or munitions.176
172

See id. at *1–2.
Id. at *3.
174
Id. at *2.
175
Lloyd L. Hicks, Guns in Public Housing: Constitutional Right or Prescription
for Violence?, 4 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. 153, 153 (1995)
(referencing PHAs in Chicago, Illinois; Portland, Maine; and Richmond, Virginia).
176
See, e.g., Bloomington Hous. Auth., Sample Public Housing Dwelling Lease 5,
http://www.bhaindiana.net/pdfs/BHA_Lease11.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2010)
(prohibiting firearm possession); Clinton Cnty. Hous. Auth., Public Housing Lease
Agreement—Part I: Terms and Conditions 8, http://www.clintoncountyhousing.com/
Lease.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2010) (prohibiting possession of illegal firearms);
Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth., Admissions and Continued Occupancy Policy 14,
http://www.cmha.net/information/docs/acop.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2010)
(prohibiting firearm possession); Hous. Auth. of the City of Kan. City, Kan., Part I—
Residential Lease Agreement: Terms and Conditions 10, http://www.kckha.org/
Graphics_Forms/frm-HM-50.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2010) (prohibiting firearm
possession); Hous. Auth. of Murray, Ky., Public Housing Handbook 19, 35
http://www.phamurray.org/murray%20housing%20webpage/murray%20housing%20
webpage/pictures/handbook.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2010) (prohibiting discharge of
firearms); Hous. Auth. of Texarkana, Ark., Part I of the Residential Lease
Agreement: Terms and Conditions, http://www.txkarhousing.info/sitebuildercontent/
sitebuilderfiles/PARTIoftheRESIDENTIALLEASEAGREEMENT.doc (last visited
173
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The law is unsettled when it comes to banning firearms
through a public housing lease. PHAs even disagree as to the
constitutionality of such bans. For instance, recently, one PHA
in northeast Florida tried to disarm tenants, while another PHA
from the same area of the state determined that the Constitution
requires “for better or worse” that law-abiding residents be
permitted to possess firearms.177 As this Section will address,
legislatures, courts, and state Attorneys General in various
jurisdictions also reach differing conclusions as to the validity of
public housing firearm bans.
a.

Decisional Law

In 1990, public housing tenants in Richmond, Virginia
brought suit against the local PHA.178 Tenants claimed that a
number of lease terms were “unreasonable” and in violation of a
federal law explicitly prohibiting “unreasonable terms or
conditions” in public housing leases.179 One of the challenged
lease terms prohibited possession of firearms and weapons.180
After reviewing the lease, the court upheld as reasonable a
generalized ban prohibiting public housing tenants from
possessing any guns or firearms but also determined a
prohibition on “weapon[s] of any type” to be unreasonably
Nov. 21, 2010) (prohibiting firearm possession); Littleton Hous. Auth., Application
for Subsidized Housing Programs, General Guidelines (Effective 3-1-2010),
http://www.littletongov.org/housing/files/LHAapp-2010-b.pdf (last visited Nov. 21,
2010) (prohibiting illegal use of firearms); New Brunswick Hous. Auth., New
Brunswick Housing Authority Lease, http://www.newbrunswickhousing.org/public/
lease.shtml (last visited Nov. 21, 2010) (prohibiting firearm possession without a
valid “Firearm Purchaser Identification Card”); Norwalk Hous. Auth., Colonial
Village House Rules & Regulations 2, http://www.norwalkha.org/UserFiles/File/
Colonial%20Village%20Tenant%20Rules%20and%20Regulations.pdf (last visited
Nov. 21, 2010) (prohibiting possession of firearms unless gun-owner has a state
permit and has registered the firearm with the PHA); Quincy Hous. Auth., Part I of
the Residential Lease Agreement: Terms and Conditions 5, http://quincyha.
phanetwork.com/uploads/Site_1006/Federal%20Lease%20current.pdf (last visited
Nov. 21, 2010) (prohibiting firearm possession).
177
Jason Yurgartis, Public Housing Ban on Guns Challenged, NEWS-LEADER
(Fla.), Oct. 22, 2009, available at http://www.fbnewsleader.com/articles/2009/10/22/
news/00newsbanchallenged.txt (quoting Senior Vice President of the Jacksonville
Housing Authority Fred McKinnies) (internal quotation marks omitted).
178
See Richmond Tenants Org., Inc. v. Richmond Redevelopment & Hous. Auth.,
751 F. Supp. 1204, 1205 (E.D. Va. 1990), aff’d, No. 91-2608, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS
27694 (4th Cir. Nov. 8, 1991).
179
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(2) (2006)).
180
Id. at 1206.
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overbroad.181 The court found that the “elimination of guns and
firearms from public housing is rationally calculated to reduce
the crime and violence that plague public housing.”182 So holding,
the court simply severed the overbroad portion from the lease.183
Shortly following publication of the opinion, the Virginia
Legislature passed a law barring public housing leases from
conditioning tenancy on the prohibition or restriction of legal
firearms.184 Subsequently, at least one Virginia PHA declined to
implement a firearm ban in public housing due to this statutory
mandate.185
In 1993, Portland, Maine public housing tenants brought
suit against their local PHA.186 The tenants alleged a lease
provision banning all possession or display of firearms on public
housing premises was invalid and unenforceable.187 The trial
court upheld the ban as a “reasonable measure rationally related
to advancing the health, safety and welfare of those residing in
the PHA premises.”188 On appeal in 1995, the Maine Supreme
Court vacated the trial court’s decision on statutory grounds.189
The state supreme court determined the PHA to be a political
subdivision under state statute, subject to preemption in the field
of firearm regulation.190 Based on this determination, the court
held invalid the lease provision banning firearm possession,
without ever reaching the constitutional issue.191 The court also
181

Id. at 1206–07.
Id. at 1206.
183
Id. at 1207 (stating the reasonable post-severance lease provision should
read: “To refrain from the use and/or possession on Management’s property of guns,
firearms (operable or inoperable), nunchucks, or similar instruments, blackjacks and
explosive devices.”).
184
See 1991-720 Va. Adv. Legis. Serv. 1 (LexisNexis) (codified as VA. CODE ANN.
§ 55-248.9 (2010)). Subsequent to the lawsuit and legislation, the lease provision
now prohibits only use and possession of illegal firearms. Richmond Redevelopment
& Hous. Auth., Dwelling Lease 15 (Nov. 2004), http://www.rrha.org/html/public/
samplelease.pdf.
185
See Susie Stoughton, Suffolk Backs Off Gun Ban Proposal Officials Will Send
Letters of Apology to Residents of City Public Housing Units, VA. PILOT & LEDGERSTAR, Sept. 26, 2001, at B5.
186
Doe v. Portland Hous. Auth. (Doe I), No. CV-92-1408, 1993 Me. Super. LEXIS
359, at *1 (Me. Super. Ct. Dec. 29, 1993), rev’d on statutory grounds, 656 A.2d 1200
(Me. 1995).
187
Id.
188
Id. at *26.
189
Doe v. Portland Hous. Auth. (Doe II), 656 A.2d 1200, 1201 (Me. 1995).
190
Id. at 1203–04.
191
Id. at 1201, 1203.
182
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noted a recent amendment to the Maine Constitution designed to
protect an individual right to bear arms and found that the
legislative history of the preemption statute proved an intent to
have uniform gun laws statewide.192
In 2004, a Michigan tenant, in a public housing facility for
the elderly and disabled, brought suit against the PHA in Lincoln
Park.193 The tenant took issue with a lease provision banning all
firearms from the entirety of the premises.194 The court rejected
the Second Amendment argument on the basis that the right is
not incorporated to the states. The court also failed to find that
the lease provision “shock[ed] the conscience” under general
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process.195 Under the
Michigan Constitution, the court stated the right to bear arms is
neither absolute nor fundamental.196 Based on this framework,
the court determined that the “[r]estrictions on the right to
possess weapons in the environment and circumstances
described by [the PHA were] both in furtherance of a legitimate
interest to protect its residents and a reasonable exercise of
police power.”197 The court, finding it was not unreasonable to
prohibit weapons in a facility catering to elderly and disabled
individuals, also gave a measure of weight to the “specific
environment.”198 The lease provision was ultimately held to be
both reasonable and a minimal infringement on the tenant’s
rights.199
b.

Attorney General Opinions

Pre-Heller advisory opinions of attorneys general out of
Texas,200 Arkansas,201 and Oregon202 specifically addressed the
validity of public housing firearm bans in their respective
jurisdictions. The 1988 Oregon opinion first determined that
PHAs are governmental entities, separate from municipal
192

Id. at 1203.
Lincoln Park Hous. Comm’n v. Andrew, No. 244259, 2004 Mich. App. LEXIS
792, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2004).
194
See id.
195
Id. at *3–6.
196
See id. at *7–9.
197
Id. at *9–10.
198
See id.
199
See id. at *10.
200
Tex. Op. Att’y Gen. No. DM-71, 1991 WL 527492, at *1 (Dec. 31, 1991).
201
Ark. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 94-093, 1994 WL 410456, at *1 (July 6, 1994).
202
46 Or. Op. Att’y Gen. 122 No. 8196, 1988 WL 416272, at *1 (Sept. 12, 1988).
193
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government, subject to the state constitution’s right to bear arms
provision.203 As the state’s constitutional guarantee explicitly
protects the right to use arms for self-defense, the opinion
concluded that a PHA cannot impose an absolute ban on
common-use firearms.204 The opinion further advised that a PHA
may not provide off-site storage to circumvent the constitutional
guarantee, but offered a number of alternative gun control
solutions, including banning possession by minors, barring
threatening gestures or illegal firearm discharge, and prohibiting
possession of loaded firearms where there is no exigency of selfdefense.205
The 1991 Texas opinion, first considering preemption,
determined that PHAs are municipal subdivisions, not separate
entities, and as such, are subject to the same rules as
municipalities.206 Texas state law precludes municipal regulation
of firearm ownership.207 Therefore, because of state preemption,
Texas PHAs are not permitted to enact any form of firearm
regulation in public housing developments.208 The determination
of legislative preemption foreclosed consideration of the state
constitution’s right to bear arms provision.209
The 1994 Arkansas opinion evaluated the constitutionality
on a ban on the right to bear arms. The opinion concluded that
no state statute would bar a lease provision banning firearms in
public housing and that a poverty-based equal protection
challenge would fail. The opinion was otherwise equivocal as to a
ban under the constitutional right to bear arms.210
The
discussion indicated that a PHA is a state governmental actor
not subject to the Second Amendment, and that although the
equivalent state constitutional provision permitted reasonable

203

See id. at *1–2.
See id. at *4.
205
See id. at *6–8.
206
Tex. Op. Att’y Gen. No. DM-71, 1991 WL 527492, at *1.
207
See id. at *3–4.
208
See id.
209
See id. at *3.
210
Ark. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 94-093, 1994 WL 410456, at *4–5 (July 6, 1994). The
opinion’s equal protection analysis relies heavily on the trial court opinion in Doe I, a
decision which was later vacated on state statutory grounds, never reaching the
equal protection issue. See id. at *1, *4 (citing Doe I, No. CV-92-1408, 1993 Me.
Super. LEXIS 359, at *1 (Me. Super. Ct. Dec. 29, 1993), rev’d on statutory grounds,
656 A.2d 1200 (Me. 1995)).
204
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restrictions on the right to bear arms, given a lack of caselaw, it
was not possible to accurately predict the judicial outcome if the
lease provision were challenged.211
Additionally, there is a 2009 post-Heller Tennessee Attorney
General’s opinion that generally addressed the authority of a
landlord to ban firearm possession by lease provisions. The
opinion neither referenced Heller nor the distinction between a
private and public landlord.212 The opinion posited only that a
landlord and a tenant may mutually agree to a lease provision
prohibiting firearm possession within the leased unit, or the
landlord may establish such a rule, provided the tenant is given
notice of the rule prior to signing the lease.213 Even a tenant
holding a valid handgun permit would be bound by a lease term
prohibiting firearm possession, so long as the tenant’s waiver of
the right to bear arms is not unconscionable or in violation of
statute.214
c.

Threatened Litigation

Subsequent to the Heller ruling, there was a scent of
litigation specific to gun control in public housing, although no
court has considered the merits. In California, the National Rifle
Association (“NRA”), a gun-advocacy group, sued the San
Francisco Housing Authority, contesting lease provisions that
prohibited lawful possession of firearms and ammunition.215 The
parties settled without judicial intervention, agreeing that the
PHA would not enforce the lease provisions banning legal
firearm and ammunition possession within public housing
units.216 In Florida, an elderly man living in public housing
owned by the Housing Authority of Fernandina Beach asserted a
211

See id. at *5.
See generally Tenn. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 09-170, 2009 WL 3666436 (Oct. 26,
2009). The Tennessee Uniform Landlord and Tenant Act does not explicitly exclude
public housing developments from the provisions of the Act. See TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 66-28-102 (2010).
213
Tenn. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 09-170, 2009 WL 3666436, at *2–3.
214
Id. at *3. But cf. Holt v. Richmond Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 266 F.
Supp. 397, 401 (E.D. Va. 1966) (holding government benefits cannot be conditioned
on waiver of constitutional rights).
215
See Stipulation re Settlement and Dismissal of Defendants San Francisco
Housing Authority and Henry Alvarez III Without Prejudice, Doe v. San Francisco
Hous. Auth., No. CV-08-03112 TEH (N.D. Cal. 2009), available at
http://volokh.com/files/sfpublichousingguns.pdf.
216
Id. at 2–3.
212
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violation of his constitutional rights based on a provision
requiring tenants to “agree not to display, use or possess any
firearms under penalty of eviction.”217 It appears this suit was
dropped without public resolution. In Delaware, the NRA
brought suit against the Wilmington Housing Authority,
challenging lease provisions that ban firearms for self-defense
use.218 This suit, brought in 2010, has been stayed.219 These
threatened lawsuits do not establish any place in law but are
significant to show that public housing firearm bans will be a
point of contention in future gun control litigation.
IV. LEGAL FIREARMS IN PUBLIC HOUSING AFTER
HELLER AND MCDONALD
A public housing tenant’s unit is undeniably his or her
family’s home, albeit there are greater restrictions and
regulations placed on tenants because they reside under a
governmental landlord.220 The question is whether, after Heller
and McDonald, public housing tenants will have the right to
possess legal firearms within their homes. This Part explores the
validity of a federal law imposing a firearms ban, state law
jurisprudence, and the potential challenges to public housing
firearms bans under Due Process and Equal Protection given
Second Amendment incorporation.
A.

Validity of a Federal Law Affecting Guns in Public Housing

As noted, in 1994 Congress endeavored to pass a law that
would have implemented a referendum among public housing
tenants to self-regulate gun restrictions,221 and in 2009, Congress
sought to pass a law unequivocally permitting firearm possession

217

Yurgartis, supra note 177.
Across the USA News from Every State, USA TODAY (June 1, 2010),
http://www.usatoday.com/NEWS/usaedition/2010-06-01-states01_ST_U.htm.
219
Legal Community Against Violence, Post-Heller Litigation Summary 6 (Sept.
20, 2010), available at http://www.lcav.org/content/post-heller_summary.pdf (Doe v.
Wilmington Hous. Auth., case no. 10-473, is “currently stayed”).
220
See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 966.4 (2010) (listing the lease requirements for leases
between the PHA and tenants); Emily Bazar, Public Housing Kicks Smoking Habit,
USA TODAY (Apr. 4, 2007), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-04-04-publichousing-smoking_N.htm (“If you live in public housing, your life is regulated.”
(quoting Vincent Curry, board member of National Fair Housing Alliance)).
221
H.R. 4062, 103d Cong. (1994).
218
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in public housing.222 So far unsuccessful, Congress may soon
enact a statute affecting firearms in public housing. It is also
possible that, rather than enacting an explicit law, Congress will
delegate authority to HUD to establish a public housing firearms
policy. The question that arises is whether such a law or
regulation, either permitting or banning firearms in public
housing developments, would be valid.
The power to spend for the general welfare and the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution grants broad authority to
Congress to enact federal housing laws.223 On occasion, federal
housing law will preempt state or local law under the Supremacy
Clause.224 Federal law may preempt state law in one of three
ways: an express statement, pervasive field occupation, or
irreconcilable conflict between state and federal law.225
Preemption under a federal statute requires congressional intent
to preempt; preemption under a federal regulation requires that
an agency have both the authority to act and the intent to
preempt.226 Although Congress has not demonstrated any intent
to occupy the entire field, there are portions of federal housing
law that have superseded or expressly preempted state law.227
However, federal housing policy is designed such that Congress
may “yield maximum possible autonomy to local housing
authorities.”228
Any public housing gun control law Congress enacts will be
presumptively constitutional and applicable to public housing
through the PHAs because of the expansive reach of federal
housing law. Congress may enact a law within the province of
federal housing law or use its spending power to attach
conditions to receipt of federal funds to pursue broad housing
222

H.R. 3045, 111th Cong. (2009).
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3; City of Cleveland v. United States, 323
U.S. 329, 333 (1945) (holding a federal housing law constitutional under the General
Welfare Clause); Perry v. Hous. Auth., 486 F. Supp. 498, 501 (D.S.C. 1980) (holding
a federal housing law constitutional under the Commerce Clause), aff’d, 664 F.2d
1210 (4th Cir. 1981).
224
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
225
See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990).
226
See id.; Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153–54
(1983) (citing United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 381–82 (1961)).
227
EJ Hurst II, Note, Rules, Regs, and Removal: State Law, Foreseeability, and
Fair Play in One Strike Terminations from Federally-Subsidized Public Housing, 38
BRANDEIS L.J. 733, 745–46 (2000).
228
Id. at 745.
223
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policy objectives.229 However, independent constitutional rights
considerations may establish a bar to direct legislative mandate
and conditional grants.230
The Second Amendment, as a direct restraint on Congress,
may invalidate a firearm ban as an infringement or prevent the
attachment of a similar condition.
Furthermore, firearm
regulation is an area traditionally left to the states as an exercise
of state police power.231 Congressional attempts to either permit
or restrict firearms in public housing may be seen as an
encroachment on the basic principles of federalism because each
state constitution interprets the right to bear arms differently,
even in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment.232 However, if
such a federal housing law or funding condition does not
improperly encroach upon state police power or violate
constitutional guarantees, it will preempt any state statute that
presents an affirmative obstacle to the effective implementation
of federal housing policy.233
Due to Second Amendment incorporation, Fourteenth
Amendment protections may also establish an independent
constitutional bar because Congress cannot induce the states to

229
See Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186 (2002) (characterizing Spending
Clause legislation in the nature of a contract); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,
206–07 (1987) (“Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds, and
has repeatedly employed the power ‘to further broad policy objectives by
conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the recipient with federal
statutory and administrative directives.’ ” (internal citations omitted)); James v.
Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 140 (1971) (stating that while the Housing Act offers aid for
low-income housing, there is no requirement for state and local governments to
accept); Perry v. Hous. Auth., 486 F. Supp. 498, 500–01 (D.S.C. 1980) (stating that
the Commerce Clause was a constitutional basis for the 1937 Housing Act), aff’d,
664 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1981).
230
Dole, 483 U.S. at 208.
231
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995) (explaining that criminal
law enforcement and firearm regulation rests primarily with the states).
232
See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997) (“It is incontestible [sic]
that the Constitution established a system of ‘dual sovereignty.’ ”).
233
See Ross v. Broadway Towers, Inc., 228 S.W.3d 113, 124 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2006) (“[F]ederal public policy in providing subsidized housing that is safe and
crime-free for all the tenants is paramount to any policy at issue in [the Tennessee
Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act]. . . . [A]pplication of [the state]
statute is preempted by the federal regulations because it ‘stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’ ”
(quoting Scarborough v. Winn Residential L.L.P./Atlantic Terrace Apartments, 890
A.2d 249, 255 (D.C. 2006))).
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violate citizens’ constitutional rights.234
“Congress has no
affirmative power to authorize the States to violate the
Fourteenth Amendment and is implicitly prohibited from passing
legislation that purports to validate any such violation.”235
Therefore, a federal law or condition banning firearm possession
in public housing will be invalid if it mandates PHAs to violate
the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment, as it incorporates the
Second Amendment.
Conversely, a law or condition requiring PHAs to permit
legal firearm possession could be validly enacted as a remedy to
state violation of the Second Amendment right, as incorporated.
In addition to the initial grants of power from which national
housing laws arise, Congress has the power to prevent or remedy
state
constitutional
violations
under
the
Fourteenth
Amendment’s Enforcement Clause.236 Congress has broad power
to reach into areas of law otherwise traditionally reserved to the
states under this clause.237 The requirement for validity is
congruence or proportionality of the means to the ends, given the
evil presented; congressional remedies of this type are entitled to
substantial deference against constitutional challenge.238
Permitting firearm possession in the face of infringement on the
right articulated in Heller seems to satisfy this standard. Even if
a balance is struck between state and federal gun control, if
PHAs nationwide impose strict firearm bans, Congress would
have authority to remedy the infringement through a statute
allowing firearm possession in public housing.
To date, Congress has been unsuccessful in enacting any law
specifically purporting to regulate firearm possession in public
housing developments.

234
Dole, 483 U.S. at 210 (“[T]he ‘independent constitutional bar’ limitation on
the spending power . . . stands for the unexceptionable proposition that the power
may not be used to induce the States to engage in activities that would themselves
be unconstitutional.”).
235
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 508 (1999).
236
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
237
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997) (“Legislation which deters
or remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress’
enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself
unconstitutional and intrudes into ‘legislative spheres of autonomy previously
reserved to the States.’ ” (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976))).
238
Id. at 530, 536.
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Second Amendment Incorporation and State Law

If the Second Amendment had not been incorporated under
McDonald, state law would have remained much the same as
before Heller. Under “right to bear arms” provisions, state court
judges would have been at liberty to take cues from the Heller
ruling but would not be required to do so.239 However, under
McDonald, state courts are required to consider if firearm bans—
in state laws, local ordinances, and public housing leases—are
valid under state statutory and constitutional law, as well as the
Fourteenth Amendment. Generally, a court will first consider
legislative preemption to avoid reaching the constitutional issue.
When preemption is determined either not to be at issue or is not
dispositive, the court will then turn to applicable state and
federal constitutional provisions.
1.

State Law Preemption

The legal status of PHAs varies from one state to the next.
In some jurisdictions, PHAs are entities separate from the
municipalities in which they are located; in other jurisdictions,
PHAs are considered municipal subdivisions.240 In jurisdictions
where PHAs are treated like municipal subdivisions, they may be
unequivocally preempted from imposing gun controls on public
housing residents. A form of preemption adopted in many states
is a limitation or prohibition on the ability of counties and
municipalities to exercise “home-rule power” to enact firearm
restrictions.241
When a PHA is deemed to be part of a
municipality that is prohibited from promulgating gun
restrictions, then the PHA too is prohibited.242 Although these
municipal subdivision PHAs establish a firearms ban by rule and
239
See People v. Flores, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 804, 806–09 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008); see
also Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 12–13 (Tex. 1992) (“[S]tate courts have
increasingly looked to their own constitutions, rather than the Federal Constitution,
in examining the extent of their citizens’ liberties. . . . [T]he state court may examine
its own constitution first to determine whether the right in question is protected.
Within the context of such an analysis, a state court can benefit from the insights of
well-reasoned and developed federal jurisprudence, but is not compelled to reach
identical results.”).
240
E.g., Tex. Op. Att’y Gen. No. DM-71, 1991 WL 527492, at *3 (Dec. 31, 1991);
46 Or. Op. Att’y Gen. 122 No. 8196, 1988 WL 416272, at *2 (Sept. 12, 1988).
241
Kopel, supra note 133, at 123 (“Forty-six states now have limited or complete
preemption of local firearms laws.”).
242
See, e.g., Doe II, 656 A.2d 1200, 1204 (Me. 1995); Tex. Op. Att’y Gen. No. DM71, 1991 WL 527492, at *3.
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enforce it through a lease provision, such regulation is
tantamount to a municipal firearms ordinance, premised on the
legislative intent of the preemption statute.243 As such, a lease
provision banning firearms in public housing would be
invalidated without reaching the constitutional issue.
In
contrast, if a PHA is an entity deemed to be separate from the
municipality, it will fall outside state law prohibitions on local
firearm regulations, unless otherwise specified by statute.244
2.

State Constitutional Law

If a state statute does not preempt local gun regulation, then
a PHA’s firearm ban will be evaluated under the Fourteenth
Amendment and the state’s “right to bear arms” jurisprudence
or, in the absence of such a constitutional provision, the state’s
decisional law.245 Even given incorporation, state and local
legislatures and state courts still have the authority to
“experiment[ ] with reasonable firearms regulations” because,
although incorporation “limits” state and local means to “devise
solutions to social problems that suit local needs and values,”
incorporation “by no means eliminates” state and local police
powers.246 It is possible for a state court to follow the same
analytical approach as the Supreme Court but reach a different
result under a state constitutional provision that provides for a
broader or distinctive right.247
243

See, e.g., Doe II, 656 A.2d at 1201, 1204; Tex. Op. Att’y Gen. No. DM-71, 1991
WL 527492, at *3.
244
See, e.g., 46 Or. Op. Att’y Gen. 122 No. 8196, 1988 WL 416272, at *2.
245
Forty-four states have a constitutional right to bear arms provision. ALA.
CONST. art. I, § 26; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 19; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 26; ARK.
CONST. art. 2, § 5; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 13; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 15; DEL. CONST.
art. I, § 20; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 8; GA. CONST. art. I, § I, ¶ VIII; HAW. CONST. art. I,
§ 17; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 11; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 22; IND. CONST. art. I, § 32; KAN.
CONST. BILL OF RIGHTS § 4; KY. CONST. § 1; LA. CONST. art. I, § 11; ME. CONST. art.
I, § 16; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XVII; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 6; MISS. CONST. art. 3,
§ 12; MO. CONST. art. I, § 23; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 12; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 1;
NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 11; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 2-a; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 6; N.C.
CONST. art. I, § 30; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 4; OKLA. CONST.
art. II, § 26; OR. CONST. art. I, § 27; PA. CONST. art. I, § 21; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 22;
S.C. CONST. art. I, § 20; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 24; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 26; TEX.
CONST. art. I, § 23; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 6; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 9; VA. CONST. art I,
§ 13; WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 24; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 22; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 25;
WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 24.
246
McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3046 (2010) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citation omitted).
247
Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 420 (Conn. 2008).
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“[S]tate constitutional doctrine on the right to bear arms is
well developed and remarkably consistent across jurisdictions.”248
Most state courts reason that “the right to keep and bear arms is
not an absolute right, but is one which is subject to the right of
the people through their legislature to enact valid police
regulations to promote the health, morals, safety and general
welfare of the people.”249 The police power inheres to the state
and is limited only by the Constitution.250 On occasion, state
courts have invalidated gun control laws as unconstitutional, but
the vast majority of laws are upheld.251 Before McDonald, some
cases applied a standard that asks if the right is “materially
burden[ed]” or if the purpose of the right is frustrated.252
However, before McDonald, most state courts, including
those that held that an individual or fundamental right to bear
arms exists under their state constitution, simply asked if a
regulation was “reasonable.”253 The test asked if a regulation
was a reasonable exercise of legislative power and was
functionally equivalent to “rational basis” review, the lowest level
of constitutional scrutiny.254 To survive “rational basis,” there
need only be a rational relationship between the law at issue and
the government interest advanced.255 State courts routinely
upheld strict gun control laws under a reasonableness inquiry,
even when the state constitutional right to bear arms was
deemed fundamental.256

248
Adam Winkler, The Reasonable Right To Bear Arms, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 597, 598 (2006).
249
Rinzler v. Carson, 262 So. 2d 661, 666 (Fla. 1972); accord Arnold v.
Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163, 171–72 (Ohio 1993).
250
1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 3.1, at 467 (4th ed. 2007); Robert Dowlut, Bearing Arms in State Bills of
Rights, Judicial Interpretation, and Public Housing, 5 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 203, 205
(1992).
251
See Dowlut, supra note 250, at 206, 209.
252
Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right To Keep and Bear Arms for SelfDefense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443,
1458 (2009) (quoting Lacy v. State, 903 N.E.2d 486, 490 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)).
253
See Robertson v. City of Denver, 874 P.2d 325, 329–30 (Colo. 1994) (en banc)
(citing collected cases from fifteen states); Volokh, supra note 252.
254
See Robertson, 874 P.2d at 329.
255
Thompson v. Ashe, 250 F.3d 399, 407 (6th Cir. 2001).
256
See, e.g., Arnold v. Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163, 171, 173 (Ohio 1993)
(upholding an assault weapons ban under state police power, despite finding a
fundamental right to bear arms).
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In support of public housing firearm bans, PHAs have a
legitimate government interest in reducing gun-related crime
and violence in government-owned housing.257
Indeed,
“[p]aramount among the legitimate governmental interests
meriting infringements on individual rights is the state’s need to
protect the health and welfare of its citizens.”258
Thus,
prohibiting firearm possession on PHA-owned property is a
reasonable use of the state’s police power to reduce guns and
violence.
Reasonableness requires little more than a
nonarbitrary legislative pronouncement to survive constitutional
review. Under the pre-McDonald reasonableness test, a public
housing firearm ban would very likely be upheld. However,
given Second Amendment incorporation, the reasonableness test
will no longer be a proper analysis.
C.

Constitutionality of Guns in Public Housing After Heller and
McDonald

State courts are free to interpret state constitutional
provisions to provide greater protection of a right but cannot
reduce protections guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.259
Nor can a PHA, as a governmental entity, unlawfully infringe on
the rights guaranteed by state and federal constitutional law.
Therefore, because McDonald incorporates the Second
Amendment to the states, the floor of the protected right is
Heller’s individual right, inhering to law-abiding citizens, to
possess legal handguns for purposes of home self-defense and
confrontation.
Public housing developments are uniquely both governmentowned buildings and citizen dwellings, thus producing an
inherent conflict given the holding and dicta in Heller. Heller, as
reiterated in McDonald, makes clear that gun bans in
government buildings are not necessarily undone by its

257
See Gibson v. State, 930 P.2d 1300, 1302 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997) (citing State
v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 21–22 (Alaska 1978); Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 501, 504
(Alaska 1975)).
258
Id.
259
City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 293 (1982) (“As a
number of recent State Supreme Court decisions demonstrate, a state court is
entirely free to read its own State’s constitution more broadly than this Court reads
the Federal Constitution.” (citations omitted)).
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holding.260 A PHA is a property-owner and manager with
authority to regulate its own, but “[t]he constitutionality of
government regulation of its own property depends upon the
character of the property at issue.”261
Public housing firearm bans have not recently been
challenged in a substantial manner, nor has a contemporary case
reached the merits,262 and available persuasive materials do not
take into account Heller. The following Section explores the
constitutionality of public housing firearm bans under both Due
Process and Equal Protection, given Second Amendment
incorporation. The lease is first considered as a contract, before
dissecting the firearm ban as a local gun control law under
constitutional scrutiny.
1.

Lease-Based Challenges to Public Housing Firearm Bans

Many PHAs have taken action to ban all firearms, legal and
illegal, in public housing developments.263 The ban is typically
implemented through a lease provision, codifying a PHA policy or
rule.264 A tenant’s endorsement on the lease signifies the tenant’s
agreement to a provision prohibiting firearm possession. A lease
is a contract, and where a contract is at issue there is, first and
foremost, a voluntariness requirement. In the public housing
260
McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047 (2010); District of Columbia v.
Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816–17 (2008). Despite this understanding being found in
dicta, “ ‘by the way’ statements made by the Supreme Court resonate more forcefully
than dicta from other sources,” and is accorded significant weight. United States v.
Miller, 604 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1167 (W.D. Tenn. 2009) (citations omitted).
261
Daniel v. City of Tampa, 38 F.3d 546, 549 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Perry Educ.
Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983)); accord Iowa Op. Att’y
Gen. No. 03-4-1, 2003 WL 22100958, at *5 (Apr. 7, 2003) (“[W]e have surveyed cases
and opinions from other jurisdictions addressing preemption in the context of
weapons regulation. The majority of courts addressing the narrow issue presented
here—whether an express statutory preemption of firearms regulation by a
municipality prohibits the municipality from regulating the possession of firearms
on municipally-owned or controlled property—have recognized the inherent
authority of a municipality to manage property which it owns or controls.”).
262
There is a case in Delaware challenging a public housing firearms ban, but
the case is currently stayed. See LEGAL COMMUNITY AGAINST VIOLENCE, supra note
219.
263
See supra note 176.
264
Each PHA lays out its management policies in an Admissions and Continued
Occupancy Policy. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., PUBLIC HOUSING
OCCUPANCY GUIDE BOOK app. III (2011), available at http://www.hud.gov/
offices/pih/programs/ph/rhiip/phguidebook.cfm (displaying the “Sample Admissions
and Continued Occupancy Policy”).
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context, it is possible to argue that tenants have limited options
for affordable housing and as such have no choice but to consent
to the terms of the lease. A lease is not voidable, however, solely
because of “[t]he impoverished circumstances and subsequent
inequality of bargaining power of public housing tenants are not
sufficient to render an agreement voidable.”265 A public housing
lease will not be invalidated on voluntariness grounds.
Therefore, when contemplating the lease as a contract, there
are two ways to consider the viability of such a lease provision
after Heller and McDonald. The first way is under federal
housing law, which prohibits PHA leases from containing
unreasonable provisions.266 The second is under the “doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions,” which holds unconstitutional the
exchange of an enumerated right for a government benefit.267
a.

Unreasonable Terms and Conditions

Federal law prohibits “unreasonable terms and conditions”
in PHA leases, a phrase that is largely undefined.268 In the
previously discussed Richmond PHA case, which upheld a public
housing firearms ban, the court gave serious consideration to the
definition of “unreasonable” in the context of public housing
leases.269 As an issue of first impression, the court interpreted
the prohibition “to require that lease terms be rationally related
The court further
to a legitimate housing purpose.”270
determined that “[i]n applying this test, the crucible of
reasonableness will be defined by the particular problems and
concerns confronting the local housing authority.
Lease
265
Jason S. Thaler, Note, Public Housing Consent Clauses: Unconstitutional
Condition or Constitutional Necessity?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1777, 1791 (1995); see
also Dawson v. Milwaukee Hous. Auth., 930 F.2d 1283, 1284 (7th Cir. 1991) (“One
could say that impecunious persons ‘have no choice’ but to accept the state’s offer—
although this colloquialism is embarrassed by the fact that more than 80% of poor
persons live in private housing.”). But see PUBLIC HOUSING POLICY, supra note 12
(“From 2001 to 2005, the number of unassisted low-income renter households whose
housing costs exceed 50 percent of their income—a group the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) categorizes as having ‘severe housing cost
burdens’—increased by more than 1 million, or 20 percent.”).
266
42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(2) (2006).
267
Thaler, supra note 265, at 1795.
268
42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(2).
269
Richmond Tenants Org., Inc. v. Richmond Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 751
F. Supp. 1204, 1205 (E.D. Va. 1990), aff’d, No. 91-2608, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 27694
(4th Cir. Nov. 8, 1991).
270
Id.
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provisions which are arbitrary and capricious, or excessively
overbroad or under-inclusive, will be invalidated.”271 This test is
essentially a “rational basis” consideration tailored to a
particular PHA. Under this formulation, it would be reasonable
for any PHA experiencing gun problems within its housing
developments to include a lease provision banning all firearm
possession.
However, most courts, when considering the validity of lease
provisions challenged as “unreasonable,” do not delve into the
meaning of the word. For instance, the United States Supreme
Court, in a footnote, concluded that lease provisions permitting
one-strike evictions did not include unreasonable terms or
conditions.272 In another case, a strict no-trespass policy was
determined to implicitly violate the prohibition on unreasonable
terms and conditions because it would be “patently unreasonable
to prohibit public housing tenants from entertaining guests.”273
The implication is that courts are generally conclusory when
evaluating the reasonableness of a lease term. While there is no
uniform test to measure the unreasonableness of a lease
provision, it appears that to be unreasonable, a lease term must
be obviously arbitrary, discriminatory, or unduly oppressive. If a
provision is otherwise constitutional, it is likely reasonable.
Therefore, in the context of a firearm prohibition, the
unreasonableness prohibition appears redundant to a
constitutionality inquiry.
b.

Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions

Whereas private landlord-tenant agreements provide
freedom of contract and an opportunity for the parties to bargain,
the lease between a public housing tenant and a PHA more
closely mimics a contract of adhesion, where there is no
opportunity to bargain terms.274 A public housing lease retains a
“take it or leave it” character because many terms are HUDmandated and practicality requires standardization for efficiency
both in tenant registration and lease enforcement.275

271
272
273
274
275

Id. at 1205–06.
See Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 128, 134 n.5 (2002).
Diggs v. Hous. Auth. of Frederick, 67 F. Supp. 2d 522, 531 (D. Md. 1999).
See Thaler, supra note 265, at 1793.
See id.
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“Realistically, it must be acknowledged that the housing
authority prescribes the terms of the lease and that the tenant
does not negotiate with the authority . . . .”276
That said, under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions,
the government cannot require an individual to trade
constitutional rights for public benefits.277
The principal
considerations under this doctrine are whether an enumerated
right is invoked and whether the condition is germane to the
government’s interest.278 The doctrinal principle finds that an
unconstitutional condition exists when an unfair exchange
occurs—namely, when a citizen trades an enumerated right to
the government for a specific benefit.
When contemplating the constitutionality of a lease term
that requires tenants to forgo their right to have handguns in
their homes for purposes of self-defense—the Second Amendment
right—in exchange for the privilege of living in publicly-owned
government-subsidized housing, there are two possible outcomes.
Either the condition fails constitutional muster or the
government has merely declined to subsidize the right.
Unconstitutional conditions in public housing typically
contemplate violations of core speech rights because even an
indirect prohibition may have a chilling effect on speech.279 For

276
Vinson v. Greenburgh Hous. Auth., 29 A.D.2d 338, 341, 288 N.Y.S.2d 159,
163 (2d Dep’t 1968), aff’d, 27 N.Y.2d 675, 262 N.E.2d 211, 314 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1970). But
see 24 C.F.R. § 966.3 (2010) (requiring PHAs to solicit current tenants’ comments on
proposed lease changes).
277
Thaler, supra note 265, at 1795.
278
See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 972 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.
Ct. 1282 (2010) (quoting Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987)
and citing Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1413, 1460 (1989)).
279
See generally Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996)
(“Recognizing that constitutional violations may arise from the deterrent, or
‘chilling,’ effect of governmental [efforts] that fall short of a direct prohibition
against the exercise of First Amendment rights, our modern ‘unconstitutional
conditions’ doctrine holds that the government ‘may not deny a benefit to a person
on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected . . . freedom of speech’ even if
he has no entitlement to that benefit.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408, U.S. 1, 11 (1972));
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972))); Holt v. Richmond Redevelopment
& Hous. Auth., 266 F. Supp. 397 (E.D. Va. 1966) (granting an injunction restraining
the PHA from proceeding to evict tenants to restrict the exercise of their First
Amendment rights); Carrera v. Yepez, 6 S.W.3d 654 (Tex. App. 1999) (denying
qualified immunity for a PHA director and a PHA supervisor for depriving tenants
of their First Amendment rights).
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instance, an unconstitutional condition was found when, by
threatening eviction, a PHA effectively prohibited tenants from
organizing.280 The rationale was that “a tenant’s continued
occupancy in a public housing project cannot be conditioned upon
the tenant’s foregoing his Constitutional rights.”281
The
previously noted 1988 Oregon Attorney General’s opinion applied
these principles in the context of firearms, unequivocally
concluding that a PHA “may not require an otherwise-eligible
individual to surrender rights under [the Oregon Constitution’s
right to bear arms provision] in order to obtain low-income
housing.”282 Under this interpretation, tenants could not agree to
waive their seemingly inalienable right to bear arms as a
condition of public housing. There is no binding decisional law
that speaks directly to this issue, but voiding the lease term as
an unconstitutional condition may be the proper result.
Not all situations involving an exchange of a right for a
governmental benefit are unconstitutional. While courts have
indeed found unconstitutional conditions in many situations,
there are many cases to the contrary. The outcome validating a
firearms ban is premised on government denial of subsidization.
This principle is exemplified in the context of abortion. A
number of courts have upheld prohibitions on expending public
funds to finance abortion counseling and procedures, reasoning
that the government “is not required to subsidize the exercise of
constitutional rights.”283 Similarly, denial of food stamps to
striking union laborers was determined not to infringe on First
Amendment rights because a legislative decision not to subsidize
a fundamental right is not tantamount to infringement.284
In the realm of public housing, the HUD regulation
permitting PHAs to require a prospective tenant to exclude an
ineligible family member from occupancy for approval is
analogous.285 It is possible to interpret this requirement as
exchanging free association and intimate familial rights for the
280

See Holt, 266 F. Supp. at 401.
Id. (citing Lawson v. Hous. Auth. of Milwaukee, 70 N.W.2d 605 (1955)).
282
46 Or. Op. Att’y Gen. 122 No. 8196, 1988 WL 416272, at *6 (Sept. 12, 1988).
283
Ginny Kim, Note, Unconstitutional Conditions: Is the Fourth Amendment for
Sale in Public Housing?, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 165, 184 (1995) (citing Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991)); see Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
284
See Lyng v. Int’l Union, 485 U.S. 360, 368 (1988).
285
See 24 C.F.R. § 960.203(c)(3)(i) (2010).
281
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benefit of public housing. The more reasonable interpretation is
that the government will not subsidize the right to live with a
felon or drug-abuser, which are typical bases for declining to
admit an individual to public housing.
When this logic is applied to a lease provision banning legal
firearms, it may be reasoned that the provision is constitutional
because the government is simply not required to subsidize a
home where the tenant can possess legal firearms for selfdefense. Any financial hardship imposed on a public housing
tenant can be analogized to that of striking union workers: The
failure of the government to subsidize a nonfundamental
privilege only imposes a financial constraint, but it does not
prevent the individual from exercising the enumerated right.
There is no exaction, but rather the government is simply
declining to extend benefits while allocating scarce resources.286
However, this analysis tends to presume that there is a
prospective or current tenant challenging an existing ban. The
analysis and result may be different where a new firearms ban is
imposed on current tenants because the hardship of compliance
is more significant and may be viewed as a penalty or an
exaction. Ultimately, permitting the lease term to stand as a
valid condition of occupancy based on a theory of
nonsubsidization is as equally probable an outcome voiding the
condition under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
2.

Constitutional Scrutiny of Local Firearms Regulations

Another way to analyze the validity of a lease-based firearm
ban is to review the rule underlying the lease provision as if it
were a local law. Some jurisdictions may have a local ordinance
criminalizing firearms in public housing, which would be subject
to a similar scrutiny analysis.287 Initially, the same legislative
preemption analysis as under state law applies.288 Thereafter,

286
See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 368 (“Strikers and their union would be much better off
if food stamps were available, but the strikers’ right of association does not require
the Government to furnish funds to maximize the exercise of that right.”); Cass R.
Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism (With
Particular Reference to Religion, Speech and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593, 607–08
(1990).
287
See, e.g., AURORA, ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 29-43(a)(12) (2010).
288
See supra Part IV.B.1.
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the Second Amendment right, as articulated in Heller and its
progeny, is appropriately considered under traditional
constitutional scrutiny.
“Scrutiny” describes a framework for evaluating a law or
regulation under the Fourteenth Amendment. The highest level
of scrutiny is “strict scrutiny,” which burdens the government
with proving the necessity of the challenged law.
“Strict
scrutiny” is generally the applicable test where a fundamental
right or liberty interest is at stake.289 Most other interests are
subject to the lowest level of scrutiny, “rational basis,” which
presumes constitutionality.
Between “strict scrutiny” and
“rational basis” are the heightened standards of “intermediate
scrutiny” and “undue burden.”
The level of scrutiny to which gun control laws are subjected
is directly related to the degree of infringement on the right and
the extent of judicial deference due to legislative bodies. At
minimum, the basis for any governmental infringement on an
individual right is a rational relationship between the regulation
at issue and the interest to be protected. Under any form of
heightened scrutiny, the legislative basis for encroaching on a
right must be more precise. The following discussion analyzes
the constitutionality of a PHA rule banning all firearms in public
housing under each of the varying tiers of scrutiny given Second
Amendment incorporation.
a.

Rational Basis

Almost all laws are subject to “rational basis” and almost all
laws will survive challenge because there only needs to be a
rational relationship between a legitimate government interest
and the law or policy at issue.290
Indeed, unsupported
speculation is sufficient to uphold a law unless it can be proven
irrational.291 In Heller, the Court noted “rational basis” is
inappropriate to evaluate an enumerated right. The Court
further stated: “If all that was required to overcome the right to
289
See Kenneth A. Klukowski, Citizen Gun Rights: Incorporating the Second
Amendment Through the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 39 N.M. L. REV. 195, 197,
242 (2009); Adam Winkler, Fundamentally Wrong About Fundamental Rights, 23
CONST. COMMENT. 227, 233 (2006) (“All incorporated rights may be fundamental,
but not all incorporated rights trigger strict scrutiny.”).
290
See Thompson v. Ashe, 250 F.3d 399, 407 (6th Cir. 2001).
291
See id.; United States v. Miller, 604 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1169 (W.D. Tenn.
2009) (citing TriHealth, Inc. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 430 F.3d 783, 790 (6th Cir. 2005)).

84 St. John’s L. Rev. 995 (2010)

2010]

FIREARMS IN PUBLIC HOUSING

1041

keep and bear arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment
would be redundant with the separate constitutional prohibitions
on irrational laws, and would have no effect.”292 That said, the
Court indicated that even under a “rational basis” analysis, a
home handgun ban would not be constitutional.293 Heller has the
effect of excluding “rational basis” as a potential standard by
which to measure gun control laws, and as such, this standard
will not be considered further.
b.

Strict Scrutiny

The Bill of Rights, as incorporated to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, encompasses the types of fundamental
and liberty interests “strict scrutiny” is designed to protect.
Under “strict scrutiny” analysis, the government’s interest must
be compelling and the means to achieve it must be narrowly
tailored.294 In considering whether a law or policy is narrowly
tailored, a court will consider the breadth of the challenged law.
Put differently, a court will determine if the burden placed on the
right is the “least restrictive alternative” for realizing the
governmental objective; the restriction may neither be over nor
underinclusive.295
The Heller Court, in dicta, stated its ruling should not be
construed to “cast doubt” on laws such as those prohibiting felons
from possessing firearms.296 It is dubious that policy-oriented
gun laws, such as those referenced in Heller, would meet the
narrow tailoring requirement of “strict scrutiny.” For one, felonin-possession laws are likely overbroad because there is no
differentiation between violent and nonviolent offenders, as no
threat from the individual is required.297 Implicit in this analysis
is the understanding that “strict scrutiny” is an improper basis
for Second Amendment review, and by extension, “strict
scrutiny” is not the proper basis to evaluate a public housing
firearm ban.

292

District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2818 n.27 (2008).
Id. at 2817–18.
294
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301–02 (1993).
295
See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis
of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 800–01 (2006).
296
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816–17.
297
Mark Tushnet, Permissible Gun Regulations After Heller: Speculations About
Method and Outcomes, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1429 (2009).
293
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Intermediate Scrutiny

While “strict scrutiny” applies when First Amendment rights
central to democracy are threatened, a lesser degree of scrutiny,
known as “intermediate scrutiny,” applies to neutral restrictions
that impose only incidental burdens.298 This jurisprudence has
potential application in the Second Amendment context, and it
appears this is a standard some courts have begun looking
toward in the wake of the Heller and McDonald decisions.299
The speculative relationship between a government interest
and the means to achieve it that is permitted under “rational
basis” review is not sufficient to satisfy “intermediate scrutiny”;
nor is the narrow tailoring of “strict scrutiny” required. Rather,
“intermediate scrutiny” demands “factual justification to connect
th[e] [government’s] rationale with the regulation in issue.”300 To
survive challenge, a law must be substantially related to an
important governmental interest without excessively burdening
the right at stake.301 Although this standard is easily stated, it is
difficult to apply.
Concrete proof linking the government’s regulation to the
right burdened is an indispensible requirement, but the quantum
of evidence necessary to establish a substantial relation under
“intermediate scrutiny” is not a precise formulation. Justice
Scalia once lamented that not only is there “no established
criterion[,] . . . but [the Court] essentially appl[ies] [intermediate
scrutiny] when it seems like a good idea to load the dice.”302
Nonetheless, this standard has the potential to adequately
insulate the right to bear arms from government intrusion, while
sanctioning the enforcement of important policy objectives, such
as keeping firearms out of the hands of convicted felons.
PHAs have a right, by virtue of ownership and management
responsibility, to regulate the premises of housing developments
within their control.303 However, the government as proprietor
298
United States v. Miller, 604 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1169 (W.D. Tenn. 2009); see
also Klukowski, supra note 289, at 235–36.
299
See LEGAL COMMUNITY AGAINST VIOLENCE, supra note 219, at 3.
300
Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 311 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
301
Cf. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 213–14 (1997) (discussing
intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment).
302
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
303
Cf. United States v. Dorosan, 350 F. App’x 874 (5th Cir. 2009) (upholding a
firearms ban on U.S. Postal Service property), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1714 (2010).
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argument alone will not satisfy heightened scrutiny. Even in
conjunction with an assertion of governmental police power as a
basis for firearm regulation, “intermediate scrutiny” is not yet
met. Unlike “rational basis” review, there must be evidence to
support the burden on an individual right.
Under “intermediate scrutiny,” when crime prevention is the
motive, “a law need not solve the crime problem . . . . Some
deterrence of serious criminal activity is more than enough.”304
For example, statistical and anecdotal evidence of high instances
of gun related crime in public housing, supports a government
interest in banning firearms. Evidence suggests gun-related
violence is higher in public housing developments than in
surrounding areas.305 A survey of PHAs with gun bans currently
in place could provide anecdotal evidence, speaking to the local
conditions and positive results of a ban over time. For instance,
the PHA in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, which has had a ban in
place for over a decade, claims the majority of residents support
the ban and alert police to firearms on the premises.306 National
statistics further indicate, in addition to intentional gun-related
crime, firearms are responsible for a high number of accidental or
unintentional firearm injuries and deaths.307
However,
“intermediate scrutiny” requires a nexus—evidence linking
firearm bans to a reduction in gun-related violence, such as facts
showing that where there are fewer legal guns, there are fewer
gun-related deaths and crimes.308
Although it cannot be credibly claimed that there is no
governmental interest in reducing crime and violence,
particularly because public housing is government-owned, there
is voluminous evidence rejecting the effectiveness of gun bans.
For instance, the same Cuyahoga County PHA advocating the
benefits of its long-standing gun ban stated that within a one to
two month period, the police confiscated more than ten firearms
from its developments.309 While there are no comparative facts
304

Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150,
179–80 (2002) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
305
See IN THE CROSSFIRE, supra note 79, at 14.
306
Mentrek, supra note 160.
307
IN THE CROSSFIRE, supra note 79, at 20.
308
See, e.g., Brady Campaign To Prevent Gun Violence, Guns in the Home:
Overview, http://www.bradycampaign.org/facts/gunviolence/gunsinthehome (last
visited Nov. 21, 2010).
309
Mentrek, supra note 160.
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indicating the number of guns in Cuyahoga public housing before
the ban, it is plain that the all out prohibition may not be
effective. Nor can public housing clearly be distinguished as
posing a heightened risk; the Council of Large Public Housing
Authorities discredited the HUD study establishing this fact.310
Further, national statistics on the benefits of gun control differ
substantially, and the correlation between gun control and
firearm-related violence in public housing developments is, at
best, tenuous.311 In fact, “[m]any housing authorities claim that
non-residents are responsible for most of the drug trafficking and
violent crime in their facilities.”312 By all appearances, the
evidence fails to establish the requisite substantial factual
relationship. Even if gun-violence is a national problem, the
facts do not prove that reducing the number of legal guns
furthers the government interest in reducing firearm violence in
public housing developments.313 In sum, evidence speaking to the
benefits of banning legal firearm possession in public housing is
inconclusive.
Further, banning residents who are innocent of wrongdoing
from possessing legal firearms in their homes denies a right that,
if not fundamental, is of “supreme importance.”314 Denial of such
an important individual right arguably has no substantial
relationship to reducing illegal guns and, given the inconclusive
evidence on the benefits of gun control, is seemingly ineffectual
against criminal gun violence. Due to the tenuous factual basis
supporting legal firearm bans, it is unlikely such a regulation
would withstand “intermediate scrutiny.”
d.

Undue Burden

There is another tier of legal scrutiny that does not fit within
the traditional fundamental rights structure. This standard
seeks to determine if a regulation places an “undue burden” on
the exercise of a right. A burden may be “undue” if it is

310

See Council of Large Pub. Hous. Auths., supra note 80.
Hicks, supra note 175, at 153–54.
312
Id. at 154 (emphasis added).
313
Id. at 153–54.
314
Cf. Plyler v. Doe (Plyler II), 457 U.S. 202, 221, 223, 228 (1982) (using
heightened scrutiny to invalidate a law requiring children of illegal aliens to pay
tuition to attend public school; education is a nonfundamental right of great
importance to the nation).
311
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exceedingly severe or lacks a legitimate and rational
justification.315 The “undue burden” test developed in relation to
abortion.316
Abortion may be the right most analogous to the right to
bear arms. Abortion has never been defined as a “fundamental”
right, and the Supreme Court has been clear that what right does
exist is not unqualified.317 Similarly, Heller is conspicuously
silent as to fundamentality and is explicitly clear that the right
to bear arms is not absolute.318 In addition, both abortion and the
right to self-defense inherent in the Second Amendment,
implicate an entitlement to bodily integrity.
Further, the abortion right is considered sui generis because
it is not easily “fitted into the conventional mosaic of
constitutional analysis.”319 Abortion stands alone under the
constitutional constructs because, ideology aside, the government
has a significant interest in preventing the destruction of life,
such that it rivals the protected individual privacy interest.320 A
parallel may be drawn to the right to bear arms: It is “sui generis
in that it carries the inherent power to take life; firearms are
unavoidably dangerous; guns can kill.”321 Abortion and gun
control both implicate a dual governmental interest in protecting
an individual liberty and preservation of human life.322
The “undue burden” test allows for government infringement
on a protected interest, so long as it does not present a
“substantial obstacle” to exercise of the right.323 This standard of
scrutiny is the most malleable.324 Unlike the other levels of
heightened scrutiny, “undue burden” does not require a quantum
of evidence to support the law but rather a sufficiently forceful
315
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
920 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
316
See id. at 874 (majority opinion).
317
See id. at 874–75 (citations omitted).
318
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2799 (2008).
319
San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18 (1973).
320
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 869.
321
Klukowski, supra note 289, at 236–37 (emphasis added); cf. Casey, 505 U.S.
at 852 (“Abortion is a unique act. It is an act fraught with consequences.”).
322
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 875–76 (“Roe v. Wade was express in its recognition of
the State’s ‘important and legitimate interest[s] in preserving and protecting the
health of the pregnant woman [and] in protecting the potentiality of human life.’ ”
(alterations in original) (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973))).
323
Id. at 846, 877.
324
See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 556 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Casey, 505 U.S. at 930 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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government interest in preservation of life.325 The right can also
be more narrowly defined under this standard, such as how a
woman’s right to abortion exists only up until fetal viability—
there is a tipping point where the state’s interest in preservation
of life outweighs the individual liberty interest.326
Arguably, this standard is well-suited to uphold many policyoriented gun control laws, such as prohibiting machinegun
possession, banning weapons from sensitive places, or denying
firearms to felons. Prohibitions on machineguns, which are
unusually dangerous to human life, would not place a substantial
obstacle in the way of a law-abiding individual’s use of other
firearms for home self-defense purposes. Prohibiting firearms in
sensitive places would not unduly burden the right to home selfdefense by excluding dangerous weapons from finite public
spaces. Nor would there be an “undue burden” on felons, because
the government interest is sufficiently forceful to prevent felons
from possessing firearms until a time when their rights are
restored or the risk to society is effectively reduced. 327 In this
circumstance, there is a tipping point converse to that of abortion
because the risk to human life decreases over time.
Nonetheless, a public housing firearm ban would likely fail
under an “undue burden” analysis. The ban would prohibit lawabiding citizens from possessing legal firearms in their homes at
all times, in a nontemporary situation. Such a ban would be
“profoundly unfair in its application to particular individuals, or
so restrictive as to nullify, destroy, or render nugatory the
underlying right to bear arms.”328 There simply is no plausible
argument to explain how a complete denial does not amount to a
severe and substantial obstacle—an “undue burden”—on the
exercise of the Second Amendment right. Further, the rationale
underlying the “undue burden” test is arguably no more than an
interest-balancing approach, which Heller explicitly rejects.329

325

Casey, 505 U.S. at 869 (majority opinion).
See id. at 846.
327
See, e.g., W. VA. CODE R. § 61-7-7 (2010) (permitting felons to petition for
reinstatement of right to possess firearms); Britt v. State, 681 S.E.2d 320, 323 (N.C.
2009) (finding a felon-in-possession statute unconstitutional as applied to
rehabilitated nonviolent felon).
328
Winkler, supra note 248, at 609.
329
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821 (2008).
326
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Sui Generis

There is an alternate application of the sui generis
classification, unrelated to abortion and the “undue burden” test.
In addition to being an appropriate descriptor for a unique right
or interest, the phrase sui generis is also applicable to an object
or factual scenario that is wholly unique, such as searches by
drug-sniffing dogs and ownership of human tissue.330 Application
of a sui generis classification can serve to bolster important
policy objectives.331
One court suggested PHAs are sui generis based on the
amalgamation of governmental influence—federal, state, and
municipal.332 In the same vein, public housing developments are
primed for a sui generis classification.
Public housing
developments are low-income residential facilities, which provide
a governmental benefit categorized as a property right, under the
management and operation of a federally-subsidized state
government landlord.333 There is no parity between public
housing developments and any other type of facility given the
affordable housing goals and government ownership of
residential property.
Even other HUD-subsidized housing
projects are not an appropriate analog because they are
privately-owned.334
Based on these considerations, public
housing developments are arguably sui generis.
Sui generis implies an exception from common law
constitutional scrutiny. If viable, classifying public housing
developments as sui generis would enable the courts to
contemplate the complexities of public housing developments
without influencing future Second Amendment jurisprudence.
These complexities include, but are not limited to: (1) a
governmental interest in preservation of the facilities as an
affordable housing tool; (2) a landlord’s right to control its own
property; (3) the exertion of state police power to control crime;
330
See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005) (canine sniff by
narcotics-detection dog); Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 489 (Cal.
1990) (human biologicals).
331
See Moore, 793 P.2d at 489.
332
Hous. Auth. of Asbury Park v. Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 1027, 1033 (D.N.J.
1972) (citations omitted).
333
See supra Part I.A.
334
See U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., Rental Assistance,
http://portal.hud.gov/portal/page/portal/HUD/topics/rental_assistance (last visited
Nov. 21, 2010).
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(4) gun-related crime problems specific to public housing;
(5) liberties inherent to residential premises; (6) and the property
interest tenants have in occupancy as appended to automatic
lease renewals. Generally, a sui generis classification is applied
to uphold a policy-oriented law. Therefore, if applied to public
housing, firearm bans would almost certainly be upheld based on
a unique fact-based examination.
3.

Equal Protection Challenges

There is also a potential Equal Protection challenge to public
housing firearms bans under the Fourteenth Amendment or a
parallel state provision.
Equal Protection prohibits the
government from treating similarly situated persons differently
where a fundamental right or immutable characteristic is
involved.335 Cases involving a “suspect class” or a “fundamental
right” invoke heightened scrutiny.336
However, most
government-created class distinctions do not touch upon
immutable characteristics. For class distinctions that do not
trigger “strict scrutiny” to be constitutional, the only
requirements are a rational basis and the absence of arbitrary or
invidious discrimination.337
At present, nonsuspect class distinctions exist in public
housing. For instance, “low-income” is a valid governmentcreated class distinction, which is used as the primary criterion
for public housing occupancy.338 Economic disadvantage or
indigence does not, in and of itself, establish a “suspect class.”339
Nonetheless, when PHAs impose regulations, the concern is that,
by virtue of living in government-owned or governmentsubsidized housing, residents are being treated differently than
those persons similarly situated.
In challenging a firearms ban, public housing residents may
assert a violation of Equal Protection, alleging discrimination
premised on the right articulated in Heller, or a claim may be
premised on a state right reflecting the same minimum
335
16B GEORGE BLUM ET AL., AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 857 (2d ed. 2010).
336
Id.
337
See Hassan v. Wright, 45 F.3d 1063, 1068 (7th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted);
Rasmussen v. Toia, 420 F. Supp. 757, 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); see 16B BLUM ET AL.,
supra note 335.
338
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
339
Hassan, 45 F.3d at 1068.
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protections. The challenge would be based on a showing that
similarly situated people, such as families not residing in public
housing, are not being denied the right to bear arms. Although
poverty does not invoke a higher level of scrutiny under this
analysis, and there is no fundamental right to governmentsubsidized housing, there may be a “fundamental right” to legal
firearm possession for home self-defense, which does invoke
heightened scrutiny.340
The low-income class distinction is not called upon to
establish a “suspect class” but rather to show that because
tenants cannot afford to live outside of public housing, they are
being discriminated against in the exercise of a “fundamental
right.” If the courts decline to call the right to bear arms
“fundamental,” the argument fails, and the challenge is relegated
to a “rational basis” review.341 However, if the right is indeed
“fundamental,” heightened scrutiny applies, the analysis tending
to track Due Process.342 Given a “fundamental right” to bear
arms, denying public housing residents the possession of legal
firearms based on their inability to afford alternative housing is
almost certainly enough to invalidate a gun ban under Equal
Protection.343
Additionally, there is a potential basis for an Equal
Protection challenge premised on law enforcement officers
residing in public housing. HUD regulations explicitly provide
for public housing occupancy by police officers to improve on-site
security.344 The regulation implies, but does not state, that these
officers would be permitted to possess firearms in their units.
The intent of the regulation would be ill-served if the officers are
unarmed.345 This scenario posits that all residents except police
officer residents are prohibited from possessing firearms. If
“rational basis” review is applied, there is clearly a rational
relationship between permitting law enforcement officers to
possess firearms and the legitimate government interest in
340

See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2803, 2806–11 (2008).
See 16B BLUM ET AL., supra note 335.
342
See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120 (1996) (indicating a convergence of
Equal Protection and Due Process where a fundamental right is involved).
343
Cf. id. (“The equal protection concern relates to the legitimacy of fencing out
would-be appellants based solely on their inability to pay core costs.” (citing Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 23 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring))).
344
24 C.F.R. § 960.505(b) (2010).
345
See id.
341
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increasing safety within public housing developments. However,
if the right to bear arms is considered “fundamental,” similarly
situated persons—all public housing residents—would be treated
differently in exercise of their fundamental right to bear arms.346
If the ban is otherwise valid, this argument will likely fail a
fundamental rights based Equal Protection challenge because
police officers may be distinguished as not being similarly
situated to traditional low-income public housing tenants.
D. Legal Firearms in Public Housing: Additional
Considerations
If a lease provision banning firearms is invalidated as an
unconstitutional exercise of state or federal power, or if Congress
enacts an applicable statute or authorizes a HUD regulation
permitting gun possession, there are additional issues to
consider. Although a complete ban would be invalid, PHAs
would likely retain the authority to limit firearm types and to
regulate on-site possession, so long as such restrictions do not
impermissibly infringe on the right to bear arms.
These
restrictions, as well as eviction policies, which generally give
PHAs discretion to evict for criminal activity, must be
reevaluated in light of a constitutional right to use a firearm in
defense of self and home.
1.

Types of Firearms and Restrictions on Possession

Both federal and state statutes restrict the types of firearms
that may be possessed and the individuals who may lawfully
possess those firearms. It then reasonably follows that PHAs
could limit certain aspects of gun ownership on public housing
property, even if an outright ban is impermissible.347 The issue is
what types of firearms PHAs may prohibit and what restrictions
on those firearms are valid.
a.

Restricted Types of Firearms

The Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Miller348
provides guidance as to the types of firearms public housing
346
Cf. Wilson v. Cook Cnty., 914 N.E.2d 595, 606 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (explaining
that, if there is no fundamental right, an assault weapons ban does not violate
Equal Protection unless two assault weapons owners can show different treatment).
347
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2006); FLA. STAT. §§ 790.25(2), .221 (2010).
348
307 U.S. 174 (1939).
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tenants may possess. Miller, a case involving criminal interstate
transportation of a short-barrel sawed-off shotgun, held that the
Second Amendment does not protect firearms that do not bear
“some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of
a well regulated militia.”349 The Heller Court read Miller to mean
that “the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not
typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful
purposes.”350 In discussing the limitations on types of firearms,
the Heller Court noted that there is a “historical tradition of
prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual weapons’ ”
but also made clear that handguns are the “quintessential [home]
self-defense weapon.”351 Therefore, PHAs would not be permitted
to ban handguns, but highly dangerous or unusual weapons, such
as machineguns and short-barrel shotguns, may be properly
excluded from public housing units through specific lease
provisions without substantial debate.
b.

Restrictions on Firearm Possession

As to permissible firearm restrictions and regulations
unrelated to the type of weapon, Heller was careful to note that
an individual rights reading of the Second Amendment does not
abrogate gun control laws prohibiting persons such as felons and
the mentally-ill from possessing firearms.352 Subsequent to
Heller, no federal court has held any of the federal prohibitions of
this kind unconstitutional, drawing both on the dicta in Heller
and the comparatively broad scope of the statute it struck
down.353 Therefore, a lease provision requiring tenants to
register firearms with the PHA may be a permissibly narrow gun

349

Id. at 178.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2815–16 (2008).
351
Id. at 2817–18.
352
Id. at 2816–17.
353
See United States v. Marzzarella, 595 F. Supp. 2d 596, 598 (W.D. Pa. 2009)
(“[I]t appears that every court which has considered a Second Amendment challenge
to 18 U.S.C. § 922, post-Heller, has upheld the statute as constitutional.” (citing
collected cases)), aff’d, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010). But see United States v. Gieswein,
No. 08-6113, 2009 WL 2837433, at *3 n.2 (10th Cir. 2009) (“We share the concern,
expressed in the McCane concurrence, that the Heller dictum may be in tension with
the basis for its own holding, as felon dispossession laws may not have the
longstanding historical basis ascribed to them by the Court.” (citing United States v.
McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047–48 (2009) (Tymkovich, J., concurring))), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 1563 (2010).
350
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regulation, presuming there is no arbitrary approval process.354
Provisions preventing minors from possessing firearms and
banning carriage of firearms in common areas are also
presumptively constitutional.355
Prohibitions on felons and
substance-abusers should, in theory, not be required because
such tenants are screened out, but prohibitions on possession by
the mentally-ill may have particular significance in facilities
which cater to the disabled. However, safe storage and triggerlock provisions may be unconstitutional because, in practice,
such rules hinder a law-abiding tenant’s ability to engage in
confrontation for purposes of immediate self-defense.356
Restrictions must be viewed in light of the burden on the right to
self-defense and in light of any existing distinctive state right.
2.

Use of a Firearm in Self-Defense

The scope of the right articulated in Heller, and under a
number of state constitutions, includes defense of one’s home,
which implicitly allows for the brandishing or discharge of a
firearm during confrontation. However, some PHAs currently
have leases prohibiting these very acts, without necessarily
placing an outright ban on gun possession.357 The constitutional
question considers tenant eviction under such a lease term, after
a tenant’s legal, or allegedly legal, use of a firearm for selfdefense purposes.358 In this area, HUD regulations provide little
guidance. Relevantly, the regulations contemplate eviction from
public housing for persons or family members engaged in
“criminal activity that threatens the health, safety or right to
peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other residents.”359
354
See McKenna v. Peekskill Hous. Auth., 647 F.2d 332, 336 (2d Cir. 1981)
(holding invalid a lease provision requiring advance registration and approval of
overnight guests as an infringement on free association and privacy).
355
See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816–17.
356
See id. at 2864 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
357
See, e.g.,
Plattsburgh
Hous.
Auth.,
Dwelling
Lease
12,
http://www.phaplattsburgh.com/lease.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2010) (prohibiting
“display[ing], discharg[ing] or threaten[ing] to display or discharge a firearm of any
type”); City of Charlottesville, Rules of Occupancy, http://www.charlottesville.org/
Index.aspx?page=721 (last visited Nov. 21, 2010) (prohibiting discharge of firearms).
358
The scope of this Section focuses on public housing evictions for alleged
criminal activity; for a general discussion of self-defense tort and criminal liability
after Heller, see Alan Brownstein, The Constitutionalization of Self-Defense in Tort
and Criminal Law, Grammatically-Correct Originalism, and Other Second
Amendment Musings, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1205 (2009).
359
See 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(f)(12) (2010).
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Discharge of a firearm, in the absence of self-defense, would
clearly fall within this lease provision, allowing for a proper
eviction. Given that gun-related crimes do occur in public
housing developments, there is a possibility that tenants seeking
to avoid rightful eviction will abuse the constitutional claim of
armed self-defense.
The procedural due process afforded in public housing
evictions only guarantees notice and the opportunity to be
heard,360 but it does not foreclose eviction for merely alleged
criminal activity when that activity constitutes a lease
violation.361 When tenants assert self-defense as grounds for use
or discharge of a firearm, it may be necessary for PHAs to
forestall eviction proceedings until law enforcement completes an
investigation of the event or a criminal conviction is sustained
against the tenant. Very likely, eviction of a tenant claiming selfdefense, without proof as to the illegitimacy of the claim, is an
unconstitutional infringement on the right articulated in Heller.
Further, PHAs have a degree of discretion in evicting
tenants because termination of occupancy is neither automatic
nor mandatory, even where there is a clear lease violation.362
Leaving this type of discretion in the hands of PHAs could raise
the specter of arbitrariness or discrimination. Therefore, if legal
firearm possession is permitted in public housing, and HUD
declines to promulgate a relevant regulation, it would be prudent
for PHAs to establish a lease provision related to self-defense use
of legal firearms and a baseline for grievance and eviction
proceedings under that lease term.
CONCLUSION
Gun control laws are now subject to the constraints of
Heller’s strong individual rights interpretation of the Second
Amendment, as incorporated to the states through McDonald.
The right to armed home self-defense articulated in Heller now
serves as the baseline for future state right to bear arms
decisions. However, even though the Second Amendment is
binding on the states, possession of legal firearms in public
360

See Escalera v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 425 F.2d 853, 861–62 (2d Cir. 1970).
See 24 C.F.R. § 5.861.
362
Scarborough v. Winn Residential L.L.P./Atlantic Terrace Apartments, 890
A.2d 249, 257 (D.C. 2006) (citing Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S.
125, 133–34 (2002)).
361
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housing remains a murky issue. The authority and interests of
PHAs—as governmental actors imbued with state police power to
control crime and as landlords with a proprietary entitlement to
regulate their own property—are diametric to the rights of public
housing tenants to possess firearms. Important rights and
interests are at stake on both sides of the issue, but there is little
guiding jurisprudence. There is no definitive answer as to the
constitutionality of prohibiting legal firearms in public housing.
All that exists are persuasive arguments supporting outright
public housing firearm bans and equally persuasive arguments
challenging the constitutional underpinnings of such regulations.
When the interests of a PHA are pitted against those of
public housing tenants, there are many potential outcomes. A
lease-based public housing firearm ban may be categorically
rejected as an unconstitutional condition. A ban may be upheld
under constitutional scrutiny as a proper local gun control law, or
it may be preempted by state law before ever reaching the
constitutional issue. A ban may be upheld premised on a sui
generis classification or struck down as an Equal Protection
violation of a fundamental right.
Lamentably, until a
contemporary court encounters a meritorious challenge to public
housing firearm bans, these possibilities are all merely studied
speculation.
Nationwide, federally-subsidized, PHA-owned public housing
developments provide necessary shelter to low-income families
who have few viable options for decent affordable housing. For
this reason, public housing is a small but vital component in
federal housing policy that should be maintained as a vehicle to
assist those in need.
Nonetheless, banning legal firearm
possession in public housing enables government interference
with otherwise legal gun ownership, strips residents of an
important means of self-defense, and very likely “constitutes a
ludicrously ineffectual attempt to stem the tide of illegal” gunrelated violent crime in public housing.363 Although there is
363
Cf. Plyler II, 457 U.S. 202, 228–29 (1982) (quoting Doe v. Plyler (Plyler I), 458
F. Supp. 569, 585 (E.D. Tex. 1978)) (referring to a law charging tuition to the
children of illegal aliens in an effort to reduce illegal immigration); accord Stefan B.
Tahmassebi, Gun Control and Racism, 2 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 67, 88 (1991)
(“Reducing gun ownership among law-abiding citizens will do almost nothing to
reduce violent crime directly, since such behavior is virtually nonexistent among
persons without previous records of serious violence and criminal behavior.”). Contra
Ctr. for Gun Policy & Research, Bloomberg Sch. of Pub. Health, Johns Hopkins
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almost certainly a right to legal firearm possession in public
housing under Heller and McDonald, only future constitutional
challenges will prove out the truth or falsity of this assertion.

Univ., Fact Sheet: Stolen Guns, available at http://www.jhsph.edu/bin/c/q/guns_theft
_fs.pdf (reporting that the 500,000 plus guns stolen from private citizens each year
play a substantial role in arming criminals).

